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1. Introduction
The  United  Nations  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for  Palestine  Refugees  in  the  Near  East 
(UNRWA) was established in 1949 by United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to provide 
assistance and protection to Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip (UNRWA, 2016b: ii). In my master’s thesis I want to research UNRWA’s 
human development approach to the Palestinian refugee population. What I am interested in is 
how its development policies can mould Palestinian refugee agency and subjectivity through 
its  inscriptions  of  techniques  of  governmentality  and  what  conduct  is  expected  from the 
refugees. Throughout its history UNRWA has had varying policy goals and changes in its 
developmental and humanitarian approach manifest changes in policy on a broader, global 
level. The human development approach it currently promotes is not an isolated programme 
but  showcases  a  larger  paradigmatic  change and the formation of a  distinctive media for 
government.  In  this  introduction  I  will  discuss  my  motives  for  the  research  and  its 
significance in relation to discussion of UNRWA and refugees in general, lay out the research 
questions  for  the  thesis,  introduce  the  sources  chosen  and  methodology  used  and give  a 
general outline for the structure of the study.
UNRWA is a relevant object of study for several reasons. The way it operates and the services 
it provides affect a population which has historically been politically significant to the whole 
Middle  East.  The  ongoing  disputes  about  Palestinian  refugees’  right  of  return  and 
compensation,  disagreements on who should be responsible for their  current situation and 
whether  or  not  they  should  even  have  a  refugee  status  do  not  have  only  theoretical 
significance but can affect the whole area in very concrete ways. Amending UNRWA’s budget 
and services are not just managerial issues and as the agency is reliant on voluntary donations, 
changes in single countries’ policies can affect the way the agency can function. A recent 
example of this is the United States’ decision to cut all funding to UNRWA.1 Atia & Herrold 
(2018) even suggest that this form of relying on donations can be understood as a way for the 
1 News coverage on the topic available from BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45377336; 
Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/28/middle-east-palestinian-israel-pompeo-trump-kushner-
u-s-to-end-all-funding-to-u-n-agency-that-aids-palestinian-refugees/; 
The  Guardian,  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/trump-to-cut-all-us-funding-for-uns-main-
palestinian-refugee-programme.
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funders to exercise their power and influence on organisations and presents a dispersed and 
subtle form of governance in itself.
Studying UNRWA can be a tedious task as the agency can be connected to an endless number 
of different disciplines and areas of study. It is tangled up in the general history of the Middle 
East as a geographic space occupied by multiple actors and incidents such as nation states and 
their  interests,  UN  and  non-governmental  organisations,  various  terrorists  groups  and 
solidarity movements, uprisings and peace negotiations2. It also embodies an unique issue in 
the field of refugee politics and offers a possibility for endless empirical analysis for various 
schools of international relations and politics. Registered Palestinian refugees are excluded 
from the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and thus they are excluded form 
many mechanisms of international refugee protection as long as they are being assisted by 
UNRWA  (Goddard,  2010:  475-476;  Khalil,  2011:  684-686).  The  significance  of  the 
Palestinian question is in my opinion still  prevalent and deserves academic attention.  The 
situation in Israel and Palestinian territories has been volatile for decades and despite United 
Nations resolutions aimed at tackling these issues the question of Palestine is far from being 
resolved. 
My goal is not to make prescriptive statements on why UNRWA’s current goals might be 
flawed and how it should shape its policies in accordance with critical analysis. UNRWA is in 
charge of such a wide variety of basic service not otherwise available to the refugees that its 
collapse  would  also  mean  the  collapse  of  welfare  and  despite  the  fact  the  agency’s 
programmes can be analysed critically, they are nevertheless often vital for recipients of aid. 
Also,  while  sometimes  the  agency’s  policies  reflect  techniques  of  depoliticisation  and 
containment of agency there is contradictory evidence too: according to a body of literature 
discussed later in the thesis UNRWA acts itself as a sort of a political totem that validates 
refugees’  claims  and  makes  their  status  political,  not  only  a  humanitarian  issue.  This 
ambivalence is at the heart of understanding how the agency operates. 
2 Qumsiyeh, M. B. (2011). Popular Resistance in Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment. London: 
Pluto Press; Said, E. W. (1996).  Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace  
Process.  Vintage:  New  York;  Schiff,  B.  N.  (1995.)  Refugees  unto  the  Third  Generation:  UN  Aid  to  
Palestinians. New York: Syracuse University Press; Hanafi, S., Hilal, L., & Takkenberg, L. (Eds.). (2014). 
UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief and Works to Human Development. Oxon: Routledge.
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Offering a proposal for alternative ways to safeguard refugees’ interests is beyond the scope 
of this thesis and also my own imagination. The main questions I have been asking while 
reading through UNRWA’s materials and various literature related to the agency has been how 
the  refugee  is  constructed  by  UNRWA’s  operations  and  what  it  can  tell  about  human 
development and its  goals in general.  By providing one interpretation of how the agency 
functions in this task is only one possible reading as will be discussed also later in the thesis. 
Discussing how the refugees are constructed as subjects is however necessary to open up 
alternative  ways  of  understanding  how  they  are  and  could  be  politically  engaged.  This 
analysis could be done to other refugee operations too.3 
It should be understood that in this thesis UNRWA is studied from a certain perspective and 
not all its operations have been analysed. For example the agency’s relatively recent mandate 
of protection is something I have left completely out from my thesis even though it could also 
be addressed in a similar manner from the framework of human development. Also including 
materials not produced by UNRWA in the main analysis could provide a more comprehensive 
outlook on the alternative forms of refugee agency and allow for comparisons between how 
UNRWA  and  other  actors  frame  issues  in  development.  More  importantly,  Palestinian 
refugees are not a homogenous group as they are scattered geographically and their conditions 
are also dependent on the country in which they reside (Khalil, 2011). Much of the literature 
on Palestinian refugees is focused on a specific area, for example refugee camps in Lebanon 
have been studied from an anthropological perspective (Allan, 2014; Peteet, 2005) and those 
in Gaza have been analysed as biopolitical spaces (Tosa, 2009). 
My focus is however not on only refugee camps or any other clearly defined spatial space. 
Rather, I seek to understand UNRWA’s general principles that are applied to the refugees as 
biopolitical subjects, a population under government. According to Feldman  (2015) refugee 
camps can be understood as “anomalous geopolitical spaces” that present an ongoing debate 
on  how refugee  lives  are  to  be  lived  and  pose  various  questions  concerning  legitimacy, 
3 Turner, S. (2006).  Negotiating Authority Between UNHCR and ‘the people’.  Development and Change,  
37(3), 759-778; Meyer, S. (2006). The ‘Refugee Aid and Development’ Approach in Uganda: Empowerment 
and  Self-Reliance  of  Refugees  in  Practice.  UNHCR Working  Paper:  New Issues  in  Refugee  Research,  
Research Paper No. 131, 1–97; Bradley, M. (2014). Rethinking refugeehood: statelessness, repatriation, and 
refugee agency. Review of International Studies, 4, 101–123.
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sovereignty and authority. These issues are also at stake when UNRWA is discussed and do 
not depend on whether or not the subject of study is an actual camp or the agency itself.
My decision to study UNRWA is also founded on a personal interest in Palestine. During 
several trips to the occupied West Bank I have had the chance to converse with inspiring 
people from all over the world and many of the questions I have asked in the process of 
writing  this  thesis  were  first  vaguely  formed  during  these  aimless  travels.  I  am  forever 
grateful to friends and strangers who have helped me and my travel companions in numerous 
ways, be it pouring a cup of tea or giving a ride to Qalandia checkpoint at night. 
1.1 Research questions and objectives
The main research question in my thesis is how UNRWA’s human development policies can 
effect Palestinian refugee agency and experience and what kind of subjects are potentially 
created  by a  certain  paradigm of  development.  To answer the  question  it  is  necessary to 
understand what kind of conduct is  expected from the refugees,  what kind of actions are 
labelled  as  undesirable  and  how UNRWA’s  policies  and  various  programmes  present  the 
refugee. My question presumes that there is a connection between human development and 
agency and that human development policies can include their own intrinsic rationale on how 
human life is to be conducted. 
I have also utilised two other research questions to better understand the broader theme of 
human development. Firstly, if human development is understood as a process of increasing 
the ability of people to make decisions affecting their own lives by its proponents, it is then 
reasonable to ask how the refugees UNRWA is taking care of are to gain this ability and what 
kind of qualities human development seeks to foster in order to meet its own intrinsic goals. 
Secondly, it is also relevant to ask what are the conditions of UNRWA’s government to begin 
with – how the agency has become in charge of such a large population and most importantly 
how it nowadays sees the environment it has to work in. 
To  examine  these  processes  I  have  chosen  the  concepts  of  biopower/biopolitics  and 
governmentality  as  my  main  theoretical  framework.  My  decision  to  interpret  UNRWA’s 
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policies as operations in biopower and biopolitics is based on the fact that the agency, as an 
organisation in charge of a specific population and mandated by the international community, 
is  an important actor in governing how Palestinian refugee lives are to be conducted and 
regulated.  As  Palestinian  refugees  reside  in  various  countries  (also  outside  UNRWA’s 
operational  areas)  the  importance  of  UNRWA becomes  even  more  relevant  as  its  scope 
reaches  beyond nation states  and is  not  limited  by borders  between countries.  Instead of 
criticising humanitarian and development efforts for creating bare, apolitical life that presents 
refugees as mute victims utilising concepts of biopower and biopolitics should also include 
investigating their productive capacities.
If biopolitics includes the presence of a productive power and the incorporation human life as 
a target of political processes, questions of agency and subjectivity thus become relevant. By 
incorporating  neoliberal  governmentality  to  the  analysis  it  is  possible  to  reach  a  more 
comprehensive  understanding  what  and  how human  development  aims  to  produce,  be  it 
intentionally or not. Governmentality acts and impacts its subjects through specific forms of 
knowledge. Rather than addressing refugee government and human development as practices 
that reduce life to pure biology, I seek to understand both as operations that create subjects 
guided by neoliberal knowledge. This point of view also allows for a richer analysis of why 
refugees can sometimes oppose actions undertaken in name of human development: instead of 
struggling for any form of agency, their opposition could also be targeted against the form of 
life  advanced by organisations  and other  actors  governing populations  within  the  refugee 
regime.
1.2 Methodology and sources
To interpret the sources chosen I have used qualitative content analysis. Typically content 
analysis can be inductive in its early stages and move on to more deductive analysis as the 
results are placed within a wider theoretical framework and inductive results are tested for 
their  appropriateness  (Patton,  2002:  453-454).  I  started  my  analysis  by  closely  reading 
through a wide array of UNRWA documents ranging from their earlier strategies and reforms 
that are not all studied in the thesis. From there I chose human development as the main target 
of my inquiry and decided to interpret the general themes and categories from the angle of 
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biopolitics  and  neoliberal  governmentality.  Some  of  the  concepts  introduced  in  the  later 
chapters are not directly derived from the more general theoretical framework but rather serve 
to complement the theorisations involved. My approach is constructivist – it is assumed in this 
thesis  that  social  reality  is  constructed  by  people,  institutions,  other  actors  and  all  their 
interactions  (Flick,  2007:  12)  and  there  can  be  multiple  realities  that  are  constructed  in 
different ways by different actors (Patton, 2002: 96).
To understand and analyse how human development is framed and validated in UNRWA’s 
documents  it  is  necessary  to  ask  what  is  to  developed,  how  development  should  be 
undertaken, why development needs to take place and what is to be gained from a decent level 
of development. These questions have served as general guidance in analysing source material 
as  often I  have found myself  trailing towards a  completely different  set  of issues which, 
though they could be analysed based on the same sources as used here, do not necessarily 
have  anything  to  do  with  the  main  theme  of  human  development  and  would  require  a 
completely different theoretical framework to comprehend. 
Studying UNRWA’s publications involves taking into account the context in which they have 
been produced. As institutional documents one should consider why and how they have been 
produced,  how accurate  they  are,  link  them with  other  relevant  sources  and  also  aim to 
demystify them as institutional texts  (Patton, 2002: 498-499). Although UNRWA publishes 
many of their documents also in Arabic and other languages, the ones chosen here have been 
written  in  English.  As  UNRWA is  an  agency  that  relies  on  voluntary  contributions  from 
United Nations member countries and private actors4,  many of its official publications are 
probably designed to attract potential donations through giving a specific image of the agency 
and highlighting both its achievements and future needs. Continuous reporting, adaptation of 
practices  and attempting to demonstrate  quantitative results  provides the donors a way to 
measure agency performance  (Atia  & Herrold,  2018:  1047).  Annual  reports  of UNRWA’s 
commissioner-general  presented  to  the  UN General  Assembly  have  a  somewhat  different 
audience and include more current events and issues. They are also commented by the UN 
advisory commission for UNRWA. 
4 More  detailed  information  on  how  UNRWA  is  funded  is  available  on  the  agency’s  website,  
https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/how-we-are-funded.
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The main  body of  text  analysed in  the thesis  is  UNRWA’s current  medium-term strategy 
spanning from 2016 to 2021  (UNRWA, 2016b). It gives a general guideline for UNRWA’s 
current objectives and provides a general image of how the agency positions itself. In addition 
to descriptions of UNRWA’s areas of operation with their specific issues, it includes outlines 
of  all  of  its  main  objectives.  The  paper  has  also  sections  dealing  with  more  detailed 
bureaucratic and financial dimensions of the agency and annexes concerning risk registers, 
evaluation guidelines and planning strategies.
In relevant parts of the analysis I have also discussed other material produced by and about 
the agency. Constructing a corpus for study can begin by setting up the initial selection of 
documents and be redesigned later on to fill in gaps in the analysis (Flick, 2007: 32). Though 
the medium-term strategy might provide adequate material in itself, it has felt necessary to 
include  complementary  texts.  In  the  context  of  vulnerability,  I  refer  to  UNRWA’s  own 
registration requirements (UNRWA, 2009) when mapping what the definition of a Palestinian 
refugee entails  and a vulnerability  assessment to conceptualise  what vulnerability itself  is 
concerned with (UNRWA, 2015a). 
Two different emergency appeals (UNRWA, 2018a; UNRWA 2018b) and a paper discussing 
the  protection  of  Palestinian  refugees  (UNRWA,  2015b) are  referred  to  in  the  section 
concerning complex emergency as a condition for governance as they best illustrate the way 
in which emergency is  operationalised in UNRWA’s rhetoric.  There are  also three reports 
included  that  were  originally  presented  to  the  UNGA  (UNRWA,  1951;  UNRWA,  2014; 
UNRWA, 2015c), the oldest one to show how UNRWA has depicted refugees in the past and 
more recent ones to get more detailed information on certain events. Two short statements 
found on the agency’s website (UNRWA, 2013; UNRWA, 2016c) and an annual operational 
report  (UNRWA, 2016a) have been selected for similar reasons, to understand events that 
cannot be discussed in detail in more general strategies and general reports. 
Including all of these sources has felt necessary to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
UNRWA. All of them could be treated in separate papers but at the same time they all overlap 
significantly by including almost  identical  phrases  and general  justifications.  By studying 
various reports as well as shorter writings on the agency’s website it is possible to get a more 
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varied  picture  of  the  agency.  As  human development  is  such a  broad concept  it  touches 
various different issues and can take on various different forms. It is not the product of a 
single strategy and can be explored from multiple angles.
1.3 Structure of the study
In chapter 2 the main theoretical framework of biopolitics and neoliberal governmentality is 
introduced.  Both  concepts  are  discussed  mainly  following  the  works  of  Michel  Foucault 
though  the  concept  of  biopolitics  is  expanded  by  including  also  Giorgio  Agamben’s 
theoretisations on bare life and the camp. In my understanding the two concepts share many 
similarities and together  they can be understood to form a broad framework for analysis. 
Biopower and biopolitics are concerned with the government of human life at the level of 
populations  and  neoliberal  governmentality  describes  the  governing  rationality  which  is 
underpinned by similar emphasis on populations, economic knowledge and security.
Chapter 3 gives an outline of the subjects of study, UNRWA as a development agency and 
human  development  as  a  governmental  paradigm.  Understanding  how  UNRWA  was 
established  and  what  it  is  mandated  to  pursue  gives  a  better  idea  on  how  its  current 
programmes in human development impact refugees. UNRWA has never been meant to be 
political agency and it still strives to maintain a strictly apolitical role. Shifts in UNRWA’s 
operations reflect the ways in which development in general has become more focused on 
human development instead of relying on only purely economic markers of development such 
as growth in gross domestic product. Human development can be understood as a new way of 
understanding what  is  to  be valued and what  development  should achieve to  begin with. 
However, it is by no means free of economic calculations but instead expands the field of 
economy in a manner that makes it compatible with neoliberal governmentality. 
Conditions for UNRWA’s government, emergency and vulnerability, are analysed in chapter 4. 
By assuming constant emergency that cannot be tamed the agency validates its own position 
as a governing subject and by labelling refugees vulnerable it necessitates the government of a 
population. Both emergency and vulnerability can also be understood as conditions for the 
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emergence of biopolitical bare life, but in my understanding they do not constitute the ends of 
human development but act as precursors for creating other subjectivities.
The  analysis  continues  in  chapter  5  by  dissecting  the  ideas  of  human  capital  and  homo 
economicus, concepts integral to neoliberal governmentality in development. Both concepts 
have been more broadly applied in general economic discussions as well as contemporary 
literature concerning conditions of work, capitalism and consumerism in society. Analysing 
them  as  rationalities  of  governmentality  allows  to  critically  assess  human  development 
beyond its own vocabulary. They also form the subject of interest in human development and 
describe what kind of identity and agency is to be fostered.
Chapter 6 includes analysis on how UNRWA understands refugees as a risk in themselves and 
how the state of being a refugee could potentially open up alternative subjectivities to those 
dictated  by economic  reasoning underpinning human development.  Even though refugees 
form the population UNRWA is mandated to develop and protect, they can also undertake 
dangerous behaviour that could tarnish the image of the agency by channelling their demands 
through demonstrations, strikes and other forms of dissent. These actions are not in line with 
general  forms  of  subjectification  embraced  in  human  development  and  instead  present 
refugeeness as a political position from which demands are made.
Chapter 7 recaps the main points of the analysis and discusses general utility of its results as  
well as the theoretical framework and sources used in the thesis. It also addresses ambiguities 
present in biopolitics and governmentality, especially when applied to studies on development 
and refugees. In order to provide a more coherent understanding of the subjectivities formed 
through human development  the limitations of  the chosen manner  of approach should be 
understood. Moreover, different approaches to biopolitics could be chosen in order to better 
understand  it  as  a  productive  power  and  move  beyond  the  rationalities  embedded  in 
governmentality.
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2. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the concepts of biopower/biopolitics and 
neoliberal  governmentality.  Biopower  and  biopolitics  frame  the  level  in  which  politics 
functions in development, human life and human beings. As development can be understood 
to work in order to support, sustain and steer human life as such understanding it as a practice 
in biopolitics becomes logical. Governmentality in turn illustrates the more general apparatus 
in which this politics is practised as biopolitics takes on a neoliberal rationality and human 
development becomes preoccupied with producing a certain form of subjectivity. 
Many  aspects  in  all  three,  biopolitics,  governmentality  and  human  development  are 
interlinked and share similar vocabulary. In a preliminary version of my thesis I originally 
included also human development in the theoretical framework though in reality it only serves 
as a subject of analysis. Biopolitics and govermentality serve as the guiding concepts and 
provide the theoretical landscape in which human development is situated and also help to 
form the questions to be asked from the material.
2.1 Biopower and biopolitics
Biopower and biopolitics direct the level of analysis and constitute the general grid against 
which  politics  and power  relations  are  understood in  the  thesis.  I  draw mainly  from the 
thinking  of  Michel  Foucault  and  Giorgio  Agamben  who,  despite  differences  in  their 
approaches towards biopolitics, both have defined concepts that can offer a wide vocabulary 
for understanding contemporary issues in development.
According to Foucault, biopower means a power to “’make’ live and ‘let’ die” as opposed to 
the preceding right of the sovereign to “take life or let live”. He examines this new form of 
power by tracing its origins back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries during which 
disciplinary technologies of power were aimed at the individual body. Alongside discipline a 
new form of power began to take shape in the second half of the eighteenth century and “the 
new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-
living-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species”. (Foucault, 2003: 241-242) 
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Foucault  makes  a  separation  between  disciplinary  forms  of  power  and  biopolitics  which 
works through statistical estimates and forecasts to install security measures to optimise a 
state of life and achieve a level of regularity (Foucault, 2003: 246). Both disciplinary power 
and biopolitics are concerned with replacing the right to take life or let one live with “a power 
to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” and they have evolved alongside each other 
into two basic manifestations of this power: firstly, assessing the body as machine, something 
that can be disciplined, whose capabilities can be optimised and which can be integrated into 
systems  of  economic  controls  and  secondly,  focusing  on  human  beings  as  species  and 
necessitating  both  interventions  and  regulatory  controls  in  the  name  of  biopolitics  of  a 
population (Foucault, 1978: 138-139). 
As biopolitics turns its attention to human-beings as population its focus is not the total sum 
of individual bodies but “a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of 
birth,  death,  production,  illness,  and  so  on.”  (Foucault,  2003:  242-243).  And  as  power 
becomes exercised at the level of population (though it should be noted that individualising 
techniques of discipline have not vanished after this induction) it includes also the power to 
expose a  whole population to  death instead of focusing only on punishing the individual 
(Foucault, 1978: 137). Death marks however also the limit of biopower which is concerned 
with improvement of life “by eliminating accidents, the random element, and deficiencies” 
(Foucault, 2003: 248). 
When  life  becomes  politicised  both  collective  and  individual  lives  become  the  target  of 
various disputes, efforts, struggles and problematisations which are concerned with how life 
should be amended and directed (Helén, 2016: 40). Concepts of biopower and biopolitics can 
be hard to distinguish. Foucault himself has written and lectured about them in multiple ways 
that sometimes overlap and he does not necessarily make clear distinctions on which of the 
two is being addressed. For Foucault, power relations are not given or seized but power is 
something that is constantly practised in different types of relationships and power relations 
result from inequalities of for example knowledge and economic processes (Foucault, 1978: 
93). Furthermore, power always exists together with resistance  (Foucault, 1978: 95). Power 
does not act directly on others but rather on their actions. Without the pole of resistance power 
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acts on passivity and this set-up transforms from a relationship of power to a relationship of 
violence (Foucault, 1982: 789). Biopower is productive and life at stake in biopolitics should 
not be understood as only biological life: instead, when people as groups or individuals act in 
the field of biopolitics they contest and negotiate multiple ways in which life can be reshaped 
through biopolitical confrontations, government of life and personal conduct  (Helén, 2016: 
42-44). 
For Foucault biopolitics is a novel phenomenon that began to take shape at a distinct point in 
time, not something that has always characterised how power and politics are conducted. It 
was also a necessary element in the development of capitalism which would not have become 
possible “without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the 
adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes”  (Foucault, 1978: 141). 
Giorgio Agamben takes an opposite position and understands biopolitics as a theme that has 
been prevalent for much longer. Instead of focusing on preservation of life his concept of 
biopolitics is more characterised by the act of separating different forms of life and calculating 
politics in accordance to these separations.
The  foundations  of  Agamben’s  thinking  derive  from  ancient  Roman  law  and  Greek 
philosophy from which he borrows some of the concepts used. He states that life can be 
divided – according to ancient Greek texts – to zoe and bios. Zoe means pure life itself, a 
form of living that is common to animals, plants and human beings. Bios on the other hand 
refers to a “way of living proper to an individual or a group” and occurs as a form of life 
distinct to living in a polis. In other words bios is the form of political life that we experience 
and execute through living as a part of a family, a society, a state. This form of interaction  
makes a human being an Aristotelian political animal separate from forms of pure life with no 
political or social context. (Agamben, 1998: 9) 
Agamben continues on theorising on the figure of homo sacer, the sacred man. This term also 
originates from Roman law and homo sacer can be seen as the first embodiment of pure life 
which defines the borders of sovereign power.  The sovereign is  the one who can declare 
exception in the normal judicial order and homo sacer is symmetrical to the sovereign: “the 
sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo 
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sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns”. Homo sacer can be killed 
without punishment and he is excluded from the normal political order, the sphere of bios. 
(Agamben, 1998: 52-54)
For  Agamben  the  appearance  of  bare  life  and  biopolitics  is  not  only  a  contemporary 
phenomenon. As he explains, even the Greek polis recognised the differences between forms 
of life and the transformation of politics has not been one decisive moment. What is new is 
the way in which the pure, or biological life, is becoming more and more inseparable from 
today's  politics  and  how biopolitics  has  grabbed our  attention  in  the  first  place.  Modern 
democracy has not abolished the figure of homo sacer but rather has expanded its boundaries 
and made it into something at stake in political conflict. Biopolitics is not only concerned with 
bios, the life of a citizen, but also with anonymous bare life. Now the individual bearer of 
rights and liberties is controlled also through his body, his bare life. With the expansion of this 
interest in zoe the sovereign's state of exception also becomes permanent. (Agamben, 1998: 
72-74)
The camp is where the sovereign's state of exception and the creation of bare life become 
visible. Agamben refers to Nazi concentration camps and the previous analyses of Hannah 
Arendt and Michel Foucault (Agamben, 2000: 38-40; Agamben, 1998: 10), but the concept of 
camp should not be understood only in historic terms or as a specific geographical space.
“Inasmuch as its inhabitants have been stripped of every political status and reduced 
completely to naked life, the camp is also the most absolute biopolitical space that has 
ever  been  realized  –  a  space  in  which  power  confronts  nothing  other  than  pure 
biological  life without any mediation.  The camp is  the paradigm itself  of political 
space at the point in which politics becomes biopolitics and the homo sacer becomes 
indistinguishable from the citizen.”
(Agamben, 2000: 41)
Agamben claims that biopolitics is as old as the sovereign exception and he equates both 
biopower and sovereign power from this angle of a juridical state of exception  (Koivusalo, 
2012:  356).  For  Agamben  modern  biopolitics  is  characterised  exactly  by  its  tendency  to 
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reduce life to pure biological life that can then be destroyed on a whim. The political and 
speaking man is now without protection and agency and the processes of biopolitics actually 
takes on a form of thanatopolitics, politics of death (Blencowe, 2010: 116). This entanglement 
of politics of life and politics of death has also been discussed by Foucault:
“But this formidable power of death - and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its 
force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits - now presents 
itself  as  the  counterpart  of  a  power  that  exerts  a  positive  influence  on  life,  that  
endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and 
comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who 
must  be  defended;  they  are  waged on behalf  of  the  existence  of  everyone;  entire 
populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life 
necessity: massacres have become vital."
(Foucault, 1978: 137)
Rabinow & Rose (2006: 197) propose that for an actuality to present biopower it must include 
at  least  one  truth  discourse  about  “the  vital  character  of  living  human  beings”  and  a 
corresponding authority to speak the truth. It also has to deploy strategies to intervene with 
“collective existence in the name of life and health”,  be it  populations, nation,  society or 
categories such as race or gender. Finally it should include “modes of subjectification, through 
which individuals are brought to work on themselves, under certain forms of authority, in 
relation truth discourses, by means of practices of the self, in the name of their own life or 
health, that of their family or some other collectivity, or indeed in the name of the life or 
health of the population as a whole”.
In the context of this thesis, biopolitics is understood as a form of politics which assumes life 
both  as  its  subject  and  object.  Following  Rabinow’s  and  Rose’s  definition,  a  form  of 
biopolitics therefore also has to work with what is understood as the truth on human life in 
order to decide what phenomena need to be assessed in the sphere of politics-of-life. It values 
outcomes of policies at the level of population and measures its impacts in the same scale. 
Biopolitics is also a form of politics that makes questions of life and death public and turns 
them  into  something  else  than  only  technical  and  economic  issues  (Helén,  2016:  41). 
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Departing from Agamben’s definition, the notion of bare life is not the end of biopolitics but 
rather serves as a starting point from which various forms of subjectification can arise and 
from which individuals enter the sphere of governmentality through working on themselves. 
2.2 Neoliberal governmentality
In this chapter I will give a brief introduction to the theoretical framework of neoliberalism 
and governmentality following Michel Foucault’s work and the discussion inspired by his 
lectures  and writings.  Governmentality  provides  a  framework to  examine how UNRWA’s 
programmes and policies imagine, create and facilitate certain forms of knowledge, power 
and through them agency.  It  can also be closely linked with the analysis  of motives  and 
aspirations related to biopolitics as, especially when understood as a neoliberal form of power, 
governmentality  includes  its  own  grid  of  truth  in  the  form of  political  economy  and  is 
dependent on subjecting life to act corresponding to this truth.  Studying governmentality is 
increasingly focused on studying the shift from the welfare state to the increase of neoliberal 
political projects and provides a framework for scrutinising “end of politics” as a political 
program instead of focusing on statements about the retreat of state and market domination 
(Helén, 2016: 188; Lemke, 2007: 45). It can also be applied more specifically to both refugees 
(Lippert, 1999; Lui, 2004; Mavelli, 2017a) and development practices (Li, 2007; Ove, 2013). 
Neoliberalism can be understood as both an ideology and an economic doctrine that has been 
widely applied at least since the 1970s. Because of a wide political consent neoliberalism 
became regarded as common sense and some acclaimed it as the only viable alternative to 
solve a wide array of problems ranging from pure economics to social issues. As an economic 
doctrine  neoliberalism  generally  vouches  for  fiscal  discipline,  cuts  in  public  spending, 
financial and trade liberalisation, privatisation of state enterprises and abolishing regulations 
that might  disrupt  the market.  It  has been accused of individualising collective problems, 
eroding social solidarity and creating extreme wealth inequalities.  (Dardot & Laval, 2017; 
Harvey, 2005)
The purposes of my thesis is however not to review specific economic doctrines as signals of 
neoliberalism nor provide a comprehensive account of its history as economic policy. Instead 
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of treating it  as a purely economic rationality furthering interests  of large corporations or 
analysing its internal inconsistencies and relationships with existing social formations it can 
be  understood  as  a  regime  of  subjectification  aimed  at  producing  subjects  “capable  of 
adapting  to  the  neoliberal  mechanisms  of  production,  exploitation,  accumulation  and 
dispossession” (Mavelli, 2017b). It is a rationality which connects various tactics to provide 
an internal cohesion of thought and that rationality can then be applied to a wide variety of 
different phenomena (Rose, 1999: 27). As Dardot & Laval (2017: 3) point out, neoliberalism 
is not only an ideology that destructs (regulations, social safety nets, public institutions) but it 
also creates  specific  subjectivities – according to them, neoliberalism is  “the form of our 
existence”. This is where the analysis of governmentality becomes relevant as it moves away 
from neoliberalism’s symptoms, for instance economic musings, and provides a framework 
for addressing neoliberalism as a form of power and government. 
Foucault describes governmentality as “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses  and  reflections,  the  calculations  and  tactics  that  allow the  exercise  of  this  very 
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form 
of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” 
(Foucault, 1991: 102). These reflect a modern governmental reason which includes freedom 
as its main element  (Foucault, 2009: 354) as modern individuals are now not only free to 
choose  but  “obliged  to  be  free”  (Rose,  1999:  87). When  discussing  government  and 
governmentality Foucault is not discussing only the state as a source of power. Instead of 
thinking of a state that extends its reach to various sectors, governmentality allows to address 
various stakeholders, actors and networks of power that regulate individual lives  (Miller & 
Rose, 2008: 27). 
More specifically,  Foucault’s  description can be understood as a  description of neoliberal 
governmentality.  The  components  he  attaches  to  the  concept  are  also  those  that  in  his 
understanding  make  up  neoliberal  reason.  The  two  concepts  complement  each  other  as 
knowledge and techniques regarding population, economy and security form the core for both 
governmentality  and  neoliberalism  in  his  writings.  In  his  lectures  Foucault  (2008:  91-
93)discusses also the possibility of an autonomous socialist govermentality but states that no 
such thing can be found in socialist programmes. This differentiation does not mean that the 
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analysis of governmentality should be limited to a specific set of countries or areas in the 
global  North.  Instead,  governmentality  can  be  understood as  a  globally  diffused  form of 
power  as  specific  rationalities  and  technologies  have  spread  beyond  borders  since  their 
actualisation in eighteenth century Europe (Busse, 2015: 173-175).
For Foucault political economy, the basis of knowledge for neoliberal governmentality, is an 
instrument for self-limitation of governmental reason that made its debut in the middle of the 
eighteenth century during the rise of liberalism (Foucault, 2008: 13). Its function is to reflect 
on governmental practices themselves, not discuss their legitimacy or rightfulness and it has 
to be left to function with as little interference as possible so that it can become both the truth 
and norm (Foucault, 2008: 15, 30). What became the site of this truth was the market – one 
could now judge governmental practices through production, demand, supply and value as the 
market  and  its  natural  mechanism  became  a  site  of  veridiction  (Foucault,  2008:  32). 
Liberalism finds an incompatibility between the “optimal functioning of economic processes 
and  the  maximization  of  governmental  regulation”  (Burchell,  1991:  138-139).  When 
governmentality becomes neoliberal, the state is no longer regarded as the absolute sovereign 
but the market becomes the main regulatory and organising principle (Lemke, 2012: 16).
According to Foucault, this shift in governmental rationality was preceded by the problem of 
unlimited government and law opposing it  (Foucault,  2008: 37). But now the market was 
reassigned as the site of truth that government should not intervene with (Foucault, 2008: 38). 
This interest in political economy, similarly to biopolitics, moves the focus from family to 
population – phenomena not irreducible to the level of family such as mortality and labour are 
what  is  now governed and the family becomes an instrument of this  form of governance 
(Foucault, 1991: 99-100). Government now directed its tactics and techniques to the level of 
population regardless of individual interests which it is composed of and acts on it through 
directing its  migration,  health et  cetera  (Foucault,  1991:  100).  A population is  now to be 
improved either directly or indirectly through campaigns attempting to for example simulate 
birthrate or direct migration flows (Foucault, 2009: 105). What is at heart of government is an 
attempt to shape human conduct – it is seen as something that can be regulated and controlled 
in order to achieve certain goals (Dean, 2010: 18) and population becomes both “the end and 
instrument of government” (Foucault, 2009: 105). But as human conduct can be understood as 
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men in all their relations, not only in relations between men each other, studies in government 
and governmentality can also be stretched out to encompass the material environment and 
technical networks concerning non-human actors(Lemke, 2012: 96). 
Neoliberal  rationality  of  governmentality  assumes  that  the  economic  form of  the  market 
becomes  unlimitedly  generalised  through  the  social  body  (Foucault,  2008:  243).  Non-
economic matters become discussed in economic terms and according to Foucault,  this  is 
partially due to its  investment in human capital: “[…] for example, how the mother-child 
relationship,  completely characterized by the time spent by the mother with the child,  the 
quality of care she gives, the affection she shows, the vigilance with which she follows its 
development, its education […] all constitute for the neoliberals as investments which can be 
measured  in  time”  (Foucault,  2008:  234).  Economic  analysis  is  applied  to  phenomena 
previously understood more in terms of for example demography and psychology (Foucault, 
2008: 245). Dean (2010: 27) argues that in fact without knowledge of economy contemporary 
states would become unthinkable as the knowledge on issues such as inflation and trade are at 
heart of their practices of government. Governing through the field of economy is necessary 
for the wealth and happiness of the population (Dean, 2010: 29) as Foucault also suggests 
through his interpretation of political economy as the main form of knowledge. In the eyes of 
neoliberal  governmentality  subjects,  relations  and events  do  not  exist  unless  they  can  be 
interpreted from its own economic lexicon (Helén, 2016: 195).
For  Foucault  (2009:  21)  security,  a  main  component  of  governmentality,  is  something 
exercised over a population as opposite to discipline aimed at individual bodies. This frames 
security also an exercise in biopolitics. Discipline can function through isolating a space in 
which power can act without any limits whereas security is something that constantly expands 
and integrates new elements onto itself: ”production, psychology, behavior, the ways of doing 
things  of  producers,  buyers,  consumers,  importers,  and exporters,  and the  world  market” 
(Foucault,  2009: 45).  Strategies of liberal  security are not aimed at  capturing and editing 
things but producing and controlling conditions of freedom and the risks freedom can carry 
(Koivusalo, 2012: 221).
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In  the  framework  of  governmentality  security  functions  as  an  apparatus  or  a  dispositif. 
Foucault  describes  dispositif  as  a  “thoroughly  heterogeneous  ensemble  consisting  of 
discourses,  institutions,  architectural  forms,  regulatory  decisions,  laws,  administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, 
the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980: 194). Following this explanation a dispositif 
can  be  understood  as  a  network  of  almost  anything,  be  the  phenomena  it  comprises  of 
linguistic  or non-linguistic in  nature  (Agamben, 2009:  2-3).  It  also responds to a  specific 
urgent  need  and  has  a  strategic  imperative  which  makes  it  located  in  a  power  relation 
(Foucault,  1980:  195;  Agamben,  2009:  3).  Furthermore,  dispositif  can  be  used  to 
conceptualise how networked strategies and the power relations they enact may function as 
both creators and enablers of certain kind of knowledge (Koivusalo, 2012: 145).
Returning to Foucault’s understanding of security, as something that constantly widens its 
circuits and attaches new elements to itself  (Foucault,  2009: 45),  its  function as dispositif 
becomes  evident.  Subjects  as  diverse  as  crowd  control,  CCTV  surveillance,  Australia’s 
refugee  camps  and  insurance  companies  can  be  analysed  through  the  Foucauldian 
understanding  of  apparatuses  of  security  (Wichum,  2013).  The  way  UNRWA’s  materials 
consider  different  formations  of security as the ends and means of development makes it 
logical to decipher its policies as an apparatus with its own strategic needs and techniques. 
What renders a dispositif of security biopolitical is, again, the tendency to revolve around 
spaces of species or population as opposed to geopolitical focus on territory per se. What 
distinguishes  this  biopolitical  space  is  its  contingency,  as  displayed  by  sciences  such  as 
statistics and probability evolved to understand such phenomena. The dispositif’s attention on 
contingencies that arise from human life is what is at stake in the modern understanding of 
security and what underpins its strategic function. (Dillon, 2007: 46) 
Analysis of governmentality and its practices can take on many different forms and can be 
applied to a wide variety of events. Inda (2005) distinguishes three different dimensions of 
governmentality that have been investigated by scholars – reasons, tactics and subjects. The 
domain  of  governmentality’s  reasons  and  rationalities  can  point  towards  the  language  of 
political  rule,  variable  forms  of  truth,  knowledge  and expertise  authorising  governmental 
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practices  (Inda,  2005:  6-7).  Tactics  of  governmentality  on the other  hand involve various 
practices  of  numeration  and  calculation  such  as  accounting  procedures,  pedagogic  and 
therapeutic  techniques,  architecture  and  material  inscriptions  (Inda,  2005:  9).  Examining 
subjects of governanment can invoke questions  about what forms of self  and identity are 
presupposed,  attributes  assumed  of  both  those  in  authority  and  those  governed,  different 
duties  and forms  of  conduct  and ways in  which  the  governed are  identified  with  certain 
groups  (Dean, 2010: 43). For Koivusalo (2012: 217-218) governmentality describes a new 
strategic field of problems arising from governance rather than a specific governing mentality. 
Dean (2010: 25) takes on a different approach and addresses governmentality as a form and 
practice of knowledge, following a more literal understanding of Foucault’s neologism.
Governmentality can provide an analytical grid against which specific political phenomena 
can  be  understood.  In the  case  of  biopolitics  and biopower which  are  both by definition 
focused on human life and human-as-species, public questions of life and death, neoliberal 
governmentality defines the apparatus of knowledge and strategies involved. The biopolitics 
of neoliberal governmentality creates distinctions between forms of life as lives considered 
valuable are those which can be inserted into the grid of neoliberalism and its underpinning 
values of entrepreneurship, responsibility, self-governance, security and competition (Mavelli, 
2017a: 820). Even if the idea of freedom is central to neoliberal governmentality, the freedom 
involved is achieved by forms of restriction and regulation owing to knowledge of economy 
and strategies of security and becoming free inevitably take place through forms of conduct, 
knowledge and sense of self associated with governmentality. 
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3. UNRWA and development
This  chapter  introduces  the  subjects  of  inquiry  in  the  thesis,  UNRWA  and  human 
development, in more detail. In order to justify my research position and the subject chosen I 
find  it  necessary  to  discuss  how and  why  UNRWA became the  organisation  it  is  today. 
Understanding the historical conditions and characteristics of its mandate are necessary to lay 
ground for its position as a governing power over the refugee population. The depth of its  
power is dependent on its ability to define and label a population that in turn becomes the 
object of its actions and techniques of government. According to Lui (2004: 131), refugees are 
not  forgotten  people:  they  are  subjected  to  various  forms  of  regulatory  and  disciplinary 
practices by the international refugee regime which is also responsible “for social, political 
and legal constructions that we now recognize as refugeeness” (Malkki, 1995: 506). UNRWA 
is part of the regime through its role in governing the population of Palestinian refugees.
In  the  second  section  of  this  chapter  the  origins  of  human  development  and  academic 
discussion, relevant to the theoretical framework of the thesis, is discussed. Both UNRWA and 
human development serve as the subjects of inquiry in my thesis. Human development forms 
a part of UNRWA’s mission and through human development it aims to help refugees. In my 
understanding it serves as a principal goal for the agency as officially UNRWA does not have 
a mandate to politically address refugees’ conditions. Human development includes a distinct 
way of understanding how human beings should conduct themselves, what they are to value 
and how they should relate to their surroundings.
3.1 UNRWA as a development agency
UNRWA’s mandate  is  “to  provide  assistance  and protection  to  some 5 million  registered 
Palestine refugees. Its mission is to help Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip achieve their full human development potential, pending a just and 
lasting solution to their plight.” (UNRWA, 2016b: ii). UNGA has also acknowledged the so-
called protection mandate of UNRWA which is to be realised through the protection of rights 
of  vulnerable  refugee  groups  (UNRWA,  2015b:  4-5).  UNRWA is  the  only  UN  agency 
responsible for taking care of a specific refugee situation in a specific geographical area as 
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other  refugee  cases  are  handled  by  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR), including those Palestinian refugees living outside UNRWA’s field of operations 
(Bocco, 2010: 231; Goddard, 2010: 476).
Palestinian refugees are a result of the Arab-Israeli war fought in 1948. As many as 750 000 
Palestinians left their homes as a result of the conflict and though there are contesting views 
whether or not they left voluntarily or not, this displacement without a doubt marks a starting 
point in their existence as refugees (Pappé, 2015: 87-96).The events in 1948 have since been 
known for Palestinians as nakba, the catastrophe. Already in 1948 the United Nations set up 
UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) that was to be in charge of finding a 
political solution to the Palestinian refugee situation. UNGA also instructed the commission to 
facilitate economic development of the area through arrangements with local governments 
and authorities as well as take charge of the economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees 
(UNGA, 1948: paragraphs 10 & 11). 
UNCCP then established the Economic Survey Mission (ESM) that was in charge of studying 
the economic situation in the countries affected by war. In line with UNCCP’s instructions, 
ESM was authorised to make recommendations on how to facilitate the economic and social 
rehabilitation  mentioned  above  as  well  as  repatriation  and  resettlement  of  the  refugees. 
Economic conditions were thought of as an instrument of promoting peace and stability in the 
area. Reframing the refugee issue and future resettlement as an issue of development was 
supposed to help raise living standards in host countries. The report outlined a programme 
where the refugees would become employed in public works, for example building their own 
infrastructure, and thus become economically productive. (Pappé, 2015: 244-245)
ESM’s recommendations were not implemented immediately due to political opposition and 
their ambitious goal to quit providing refugees with ratios by the end of 1950 (Richardson, 
1950: 53; UNCCP, 1949) turned out to be only wishful thinking. One recommendation to 
come true was to set up an agency that would oversee continuing development and assistance 
efforts, and UNRWA was established by UNGA resolution 302 (IV) in 1949. In its resolution 
UNGA recognises  that  “continued  assistance  for  the  relief  of  the  Palestine  refugees  is 
necessary  to  prevent  conditions  of  starvation  and  distress  among  them  and  to  further 
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conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an 
early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief” (UNGA, 1949: 
paragraph 5). 
The purpose of this resolution was to gradually transfer responsibility from relief agencies to 
local governments. UNRWA was to consult with them about preparatory measures for “the 
time  when  international  assistance  for  relief  and  works  projects  is  no  longer  available” 
(UNGA, 1949:  paragraph 7b). Following ESM’s recommendations the agency would also 
“attempt to guide an increasing number of refugees into projects such as well-digging, road-
building, clearing, irrigation, and reforestation; it will endeavor to lower the numbers on the 
relief rolls and to begin the process of re-establishment of fundamental social and economic 
ties” (Richardson, 1950: 53-54).
Palestinian refugees were situated in the context of development already in the first  ESM 
report detailing their conditions and seeking to find a fundamental solution to region’s social 
and economic problems:
“The purpose of the proposed programme of relief and public works is four-fold: it 
will halt the demoralizing effect of pauperization, outcome of a dole prolonged; the 
opportunity to work will increase the practical alternatives available to refugees, and 
thereby encourage a more realistic view of the kind of future they want and the kind 
they can achieve; a works programme properly planned will  add to the productive 
economy of the countries where the refugees are located; the chance to earn a living 
will reduce the need for relief and bring its cost within the ability of the Near Eastern 
countries to meet without United Nations Assistance.”
(UNCCP, 1949: 12)
As  the  responsibility  of  implementing  various  programmes  and distribution  of  relief  was 
transferred  to  UNRWA,  this  notion  persisted.  It  should  be  understood  that  UNRWA has 
always been a development agency and it has not been granted a role to seek for a political 
solution to the refugees’ plight. Changes in its policies mirror the changes that have affected 
development  doctrines  from  the  1950s  to  present  days.  In  the  1950s  “a  development 
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knowledge industry” emerged and in the 1960s agencies such as UNHCR and the World Bank 
were  encouraged  to  link  refugee  programmes  and  developmental  efforts  as  displacement 
became both an economic and a  political  issue  (Lui,  2004:  128-129).  Western authorities 
alsoacknowledged that the state of the world could lead to continuous production of refugee 
crises and movements: when these crises would arise routinely, each would become viewed as 
a typical refugee crisis instead of an unique problem (Lippert, 1999: 302-303). According to 
Malkki (1995: 506-507), incorporating development discourse can potentially render other 
intellectual and political connections inscrutable:
“If nothing else, the development discourse on refugees has sometimes facilitated the 
continued depoliticization  of  refugee  movements;  for  instead  of  foregrounding the 
political, historical processes that generated a given group of refugees, and that reach 
far beyond the country of asylum and the refugee camp, development projects tend to 
see the whole world in a refugee camp.”
(Malkki, 1995: 507)
As displacement situations became more permanent there was a growing need to deal with the 
issue at hand and development became a tool for “subjection of people who in turn subjected 
themselves  to  systematic  and  comprehensive  intervention”  (Lui,  2004:  128).  The  body 
officially in charge of finding a political solution for the Palestinian refugee situation is still 
UNCCP (Bocco, 2010: 232), as stated in the original resolution instructing its purposes of 
operation. Currently UNCCP has no staff and no budget as its efforts at mediating came to 
halt by the 1960’s – at the moment its annual reports to UNGA just state that there is nothing 
to report (Irfan, 2017: 17).5 
There are many local actors that also share a role especially in the government of refugee 
camps as spatial places. In Syria and Jordan the state controls the camps through selecting 
camp directors involved in organising political life in the camps whereas in Lebanon and the 
occupied Palestinian territory there is a more complicated power structure in place (Hanafi, 
5 See for example the 71st report of the conciliation commission, available at http://www.undocs.org/A/72/332: 
“The Commission recalls its report of 17 August 2016 (A/71/335) and observes that it has nothing new to 
report  since the submission of  that  report.”  Looking back at  the  past  reports  one can  notice how their 
wording barely chances from year to year: UNCCP mentions the previous report and states that there is  
nothing new to report. The commission is still requested to submit these observations annually though they 
have become essentially meaningless with no content whatsoever.
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2014:  163).Different  actors  vary  in  their  importance  between  camps  and  power  relations 
between groups are not fixed. These parties include popular committees, political factions, 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) unions and organisations, community-based and 
non-governmental organisations (Busse, 2015: 183;  Hanafi,  2014: 163-164).  The scope of 
UNRWA’s services and their UN mandate however differentiate the agency greatly from these 
local actors. According to Bocco (2010: 234), it effectively functions as a quasi-state through 
its  vast  provision  of  parallel  public  services  to  the  refugee  population.  Most  refugees 
registered by the agency are stateless and UNRWA has a role in providing them with some 
form of international representation (Irfan, 2017: 12-13). 
3.2 Human development
Human development seeks to provide an additional way to understanding development that 
has often been measured mainly in economic terms. United Nations has been advocating the 
approach since releasing its  first  Human Development Report in 1990 by United Nations 
Development  Programme  (UNDP).  In  the  context  of  this  thesis  human  development  is 
understood  essentially  as  a  strategy  of  biopolitical  and  neoliberal  governmentality.  It  is 
targeted at human beings at the level of populations and consists in a sense a dispositif of 
security in itself.  It  asks for individuals to work on themselves through the capabilities it 
supposedly provides and renders security to an individualised phenomenon also dependent on 
these capabilities.
United  Nations’ conceptualisation  of  human  development  has  been  influenced  greatly  by 
writings of economist Amartya Sen and its two main dimensions are expansion of freedom 
and human capabilities. Freedom and capabilities are interlinked as together they enhance and 
reinforce each other (Sen, 1999: 40). Both need to be taken into account for the desired level 
of human development to be realised.  In the 1990 report human development is defined as 
follows:
“Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. In principle, these 
choice can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the three 
essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and 
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to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. If these essential 
choices are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible.”
(UNDP, 1990: 10)
The goals of healthy life, knowledge and attaining a decent standard of living form the main 
capabilities that help people to gain the “strength to manage their affairs” (UNDP, 1990: 16). 
In  addition to  creating  a  favourable environment  and promoting policies  advancing these 
capabilities human development is also concerned with how people actually make use of these 
capabilities, be it in their leisure or working time  (UNDP, 1990: 10-11).  It is then not only 
about providing specific capabilities but also how these capabilities are utilised. All in all, 
healthy and educated people “are in a better position than others to take their lives into their 
own hands” and “more valuable to society and better equipped to help themselves” (UNDP, 
1990: 26).
In addition to this expansion of human choices through expansion of their capabilities also 
freedom, as mentioned earlier, constitutes an integral aspect of United Nations’ understanding 
of human development:
“People must be free to actively participate in economic and political life – setting 
developmental priorities, formulating policies, implementing projects and choosing the 
form of government to influence their cultural environment. Such freedom ensures that 
social  goals  do  not  become  mechanical  devices  in  the  hands  of  paternalistic 
governments. If human development is the outer shell, freedom is its priceless pearl.”
(UNDP, 1990: 84)
This emphasis on freedom has persisted in the reports throughout annual publications. For 
Sen  freedom is  both  the  principal  means  of  development  and  at  the  same time  also  the 
primary ends of it – therefore the assessment of development has to take into account first and 
foremost expansion on freedoms such as the freedom of being literate and the freedom of 
avoiding premature mortality  (Sen, 1999: 36). These freedoms are necessary for people to 
make use of their attained capabilities and enable them to “pursue choices that they value” 
(UNDP, 2016: 1). 
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When policies are evaluated from the perspective of capabilities one might ask the following 
questions: are people healthy and do they have adequate access to healthcare to ensure health 
itself?  Are  people  well-nourished and  is  this  capability  encouraged  by for  example  food 
entitlements? (Robeyns, 2005: 95-96) Poor health, illiteracy and lack of access to resources 
hinder a person from achieving full  human development and render capacities inadequate 
(Fukuda-Parr,  2003:  303):  like  freedom,  they  also  become both  ends and means.  Human 
development is then focused on a distinct set of questions that are concerned with how human 
life is supported and nourished and how its capabilities are supported to obtain optimal well-
being.  These capabilities are not fixed and the ability to pursue valued goals is,  as stated 
earlier, a process that can constantly expand freedom and make way for further capacity-
building. 
This  people-centred  approach  can  be  viewed  as  more  nuanced  when  contrasted  with 
inspecting development only through income, growth and economy. Goods and services are 
appreciated  for  their  functional  value,  not  just  exchangeable  value  or  material  reality 
(Robeyns,  2005;  98).  Measuring  issues  such  as  freedom  of  speech  or  literacy  works 
differently to calculating for example gross domestic product and the increasing focus on the 
individual  human,  his  or  her  capabilities  and  freedoms  intertwined,  is  exactly  what  the 
approach has been meant to achieve. Human development paradigm has been viewed as a 
countering force to neoliberal tendencies to reduce public spending and roll back welfare as 
within it people, not profits, become the object of development (Shani, 2012: 100). 
David  Chandler  (2013) however  criticises  this  shift  in  understanding  of  development. 
Although human development approach grants external structures and institutions some part 
in  contributing  to  freedom,  they  are  not  themselves  constitutive  of  it  and instead  of  any 
universal external measurements human development can be understood simply as an internal 
process of empowerment (Chandler, 2013: 13). Poverty takes on a new meaning as it is now 
viewed  as  absence  of  choices,  not  in  conventional  economic  terms  (Shani,  2012:  104). 
Though its is not a new phenomenon that development constructs issues such as employment, 
hygiene and education as social  problems and governs  them through knowledge gathered 
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from populations (Escobar, 1995: 23), the doctrine of human development renders it more of 
an individual process focused on an individual’s inner life. 
Although human development has been touted for having a more balanced approach between 
the goals of economic growth and human well-being (UNDP, 1990; UNDP, 2016)there is still 
a  significant  economic  apparatus  operating  within  it  which  places  it  in  the  sphere  of 
biopolitical  and  neoliberal  governmentality.  As  referenced  in  the  previous  section, 
governmentality  includes  the tendency of  taking phenomena not  previously understood in 
economic  terms  and  making  them  part  of  economic  knowledge  and  inquiry.  Human 
development shares this neoliberal belief in the markets: choices and capabilities that have 
become the target of development programmes and interventions are to be used in the market 
and well-functioning markets are also essential for capacity-building to take place. 
Shani  (2012:  105-106) argues that for Amartya Sen the freedom to enter the market is  a 
significant part of development and the options that can then be pursued are typical to “social 
relations under capitalism: trade-based entitlements obtained by ‘trading something one owns 
with a willing party’; production-based entitlements derived from the productive use of ‘one’s 
own resources’; entitlements deriving from ‘one’s own labour power’; and inheritance and 
transfer  entitlements”.  When  human  development  is  viewed  as  a  case  of  neoliberal 
governmentality  Shani’s  critique  becomes  relevant  as  despite  its  initial  claims  human 
development  is  not  free  from  economic  rationalities.  Though  its  aims  include  enlarging 
people’s  capacities  so  that  they  can  themselves  make  choice  they  individually  value, 
governmentality  defines  a  field  in  which  people  are  to  participate  and  inscribes  its  own 
knowledge in practices concerning improvement of life.
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4. Conditions for government
In this chapter I will discuss how UNRWA describes the environment in which it operates, 
both in terms of external realities and refugees’ characteristics. Framing the space and the act 
of labelling refugees illustrate the agency’s rationality as a development agency and act as 
justifications  for  its  operations.  UNRWA’s  power  and  reach  as  a  development  agency  is 
influenced by two key conditions, a prolonged state of emergency and vulnerability of the 
refugees. These attempts to understand both the population and environment of government 
name the field in which power is exercised and form an integral part of the political rationality 
for the agency’s endeavours  (Inda, 2005: 8; Rose & Miller, 1992: 175). They also help to 
answer what is to be developed in the first place and why development should take place.
Emergency and vulnerability can be seen as domains which, following Bauman (2007: 42), 
“assure the permanence of their exclusion”. This exclusion together with describing both the 
refugees’ spatial living space and personal conditions as something aleatory and complex act 
as precursors for government. Though the initial circumstances preceding emergency are at 
first  regarded  as  exceptional  and  temporary,  over  time  they  can  become  a  permanent 
arrangement and evolve into a situation of power (Agier, 2008: 43-44). Danger and insecurity 
are  also  necessary  components  for  a  neoliberal  governmentality  as  the  constant  fear  of 
insecurity is included in its moral dimension which then paves way for government of human 
conduct  (Lemke,  2014:  65).  Emergency  and  vulnerability  are  not  the  end  result  of 
development interventions but rather serve as a pretext for them and also constitute part of the 
governmental knowledge of UNRWA.
4.1 State of emergency
State of emergency characterises the space in which UNRWA has to operate. It should not be 
understood only in spatial terms even though it is shaped by regional conflicts and interests. 
In this section I will discuss how UNRWA speaks of the reality where both the agency and 
refugees are situated and how it necessitates the agency's government over refugees. In its 
current medium-term strategy, UNRWA presents the context for its operations the following 
way:
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“The Middle East is experiencing significant political, social and economic changes. 
Instability and, in some cases, active conflict are expected to characterize the macro-
environment for most, if not all, of the strategic period. Recent events in all fields of 
UNRWA operations indicate that the coming strategic period could herald even more 
complexity and uncertainty.”
(UNRWA, 2016b: 10)
The environment in which UNRWA operates is saturated with complexity and widespread 
insecurity. Conditions for this complexity are not something UNRWA can directly address: 
situations such as the Gaza blockade, Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the protracted 
crisis  in  Syria  form the  political  backdrop  for  its  operations.  It  has  to  work  in  a  world 
characterised by complex emergencies which in turn facilitate the demand for its services and 
assistance. (UNRWA, 2016b: 5, 11) 
UNRWA regularly publishes emergency appeals demanding attention to area-specific issues 
and urging its donors to take action in order to secure its operations6. They are categorised 
regionally,  and for example in 2017 the agency published appeals for all  its territories of 
operation followed with reports on the progress achieved through them. In recent appeals for 
2018 the agency states how in the occupied Palestinian territory, consisting of West Bank and 
Gaza,  a “protracted humanitarian emergency”  (UNRWA, 2018a: 4) is  taking place and in 
Syria,  amidst  an  internal  crisis,  acute  crises  can  erupt  due  to  widespread  violence  and 
fluctuations in humanitarian access (UNRWA, 2018b: 6). 
In the case of occupied Palestinian territories, West Bank and Gaza, the emergency is assumed 
to continue as Gaza is expected to remain under blockade, restriction of movement will not 
diminish, no significant economic recovery is likely to take place, Israeli settlements will be 
further expanded, Bedouin communities are forcibly transferred and Israel’s permit regime 
will have an effect on how UNRWA is able to carry out its mandate (UNRWA, 2018a: 5). In 
Gaza UNRWA prioritises ensuring that “crisis-affected Palestine refugee households facing 
acute  shocks  have  increased  economic  access  to  food”  through  emergency  assistance, 
6 UNRWA’s emergency appeals can be found at https://www.unrwa.org/resources/emergency-appeals. 
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providing them with temporary working opportunities and creating income opportunities for 
self-employed refugee women (UNRWA, 2018a: 8-10). 
Refugees should also be able to “enjoy their rights to critical services and assistance” through 
providing  them  them  with  emergency  health,  education,  sanitation  and  shelter  services 
(UNRWA, 2018a: 11-14) as well as be “protected from the effects of the conflict and violence 
community” which can be achieved by supporting community mental health through students’ 
life-skills training, mitigating the effect eroding coping strategies have and organising summer 
fun  weeks  (UNRWA,  2018a:  15-17).  Similar  strategic  priorities  are  also  assigned  to 
UNRWA’s operations in the West Bank (UNRWA, 2018a: 19-26) with some minor changes 
such  as  directing  community  mental  health  services  to  Bedouin  communities  instead  of 
students,  leaving out  summer  fun  weeks  and  narrowing critical  services  down to  mobile 
health clinics.
Syrian  Regional  Crisis  Emergency  Appeal  (UNRWA,  2018b) is  concerned  with  a  more 
extensive geographical  area  as  the crisis  has  affected  not  only Syria  but  also Jordan and 
Lebanon.  UNRWA describes  the  situation  bleakly:  “In  the  absence  of  a  durable  political 
settlement,  intense  and  widespread  hostilities  persist,  resulting  in  deaths  and  injuries, 
increased internal  displacement,  large-scale  movement  of  refugees  to  other  countries,  lost 
livelihoods,  mounting  humanitarian  needs,  and  severe  humanitarian  access  restrictions  in 
many  areas,  including  UNRWA areas  of  operations.”  (UNRWA,  2018b).  In  Syria  armed 
conflict is expected to continue, humanitarian needs will remain high and at the same time 
accessing humanitarian help can be difficult, refugees will face serious protection risks and 
the operational context requires a mixed approach of both humanitarian and developmental 
interventions  (UNRWA, 2018b: 5-6). Refugees residing in Lebanon will have to deal with 
difficulties in maintaining their legal status in the country, humanitarian needs are at a high 
level, the number of Palestinian refugees from Syria will grow, economic deterioration will 
continue  and  there  will  be  ongoing  conflicts  between  displaced  refugees  and  their  host 
communities (UNRWA, 2018b: 20-21). Similar problems are present in Jordan. The refugees 
from Syria face a risk of forced return because the Jordanian government has denied their 
entry, the refugees’ conditions are worsened by economic problems and a high number of 
them are categorised as extremely vulnerable (UNRWA, 2018b: 34). 
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In  the  case  of  the  Syrian  emergency,  UNRWA’s  strategic  priorities  include  preserving 
refugees’ resilience through provision of humanitarian assistance, maintaining access to basic 
services  as  a  means  of  contributing  to  a  protective  environment  and  strengthening 
humanitarian  capacity,  coordination  and  management  (UNRWA,  2018b:  22-43).  In  more 
detail, these priorities are to be implemented by providing refugees with emergency assistance 
in  the  form  of  food,  cash  and  noon-food  item  provisions  and  winterisation  assistance 
(UNRWA, 2018b: 7, 22, 35). To maintain a protective environment UNRWA plans on giving 
out  microfinance  loans,  improving  employment  opportunities  focusing  on  environmental 
health and more generally focusing on its core services of healthcare and education (UNRWA, 
2018b: 10, 24, 37). Assessing humanitarian capacity, coordination and management is to be 
achieved by focusing on staff security and training, ensuring cost-effectiveness of the services 
provided and upgrading agency’s facilities (UNRWA, 2018b: 17, 31, 42). 
Both  emergency  appeals,  one  concerning  occupied  Palestinian  territories  and  other  the 
regional crisis stemming from war in Syria, portray how emergency necessitates interventions 
and  lays  the  base  for  different  strategies  and policy  objectives.  Emergency  justifies  why 
UNRWA has to intervene and the audience of the appeals are encouraged to contribute to 
mitigating  harmful  effects  through donations  or  at  least  maintain  their  support  amidst  an 
inevitable crisis (UNRWA, 2018a: ii; UNRWA, 2018b: ii). Operating in a state of emergency 
also calls forth reflexive policies as in addition to provision of direct relief UNRWA has to 
enhance staff capacities and make an effort to maintain itself as a functioning agency despite 
occasional  financial  disruptions.  Emergency  shapes  both  UNRWA itself  and  the  refugee 
population  which  is  expected  to  continue  facing  difficult  circumstances  in  all  their 
contingency.
Insecurity, uncertainty and complexity are then seen as the key defining features of the space 
of operations. UNRWA is not able to work alone but states that it is intent on cooperating with 
other relevant actors as the agency “is unable to resolve the underlying causes of refugee 
needs” (UNRWA, 2016b: 24), the wider political situation in the region. There is a constant 
possibility for a potential emergency, and this uncertainty of external events underpins all 
UNRWA’s programmes. It also becomes a foundation for its trusteeship for the betterment of 
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the  refugee  population.  Conditions  of  emergency  form  a  basis  for  the  rationale  of 
governmentality inscribed in UNRWA's actions as a development agency and without them it 
could not act the way it does. UNRWA does not seek to transform external conditions that  
have given rise to emergencies in the first place, rather it takes them as they come and go and 
let them form the reality against which it conducts itself and seeks to conduct the refugees too.
Complex emergency and the state of exception it creates make it possible to enter the world of 
peoples  and  invoke  the  demand  for  development  (Duffield,  2007:  52-53).  Emergency 
necessitates  governance  through  development  and  becomes  a  condition  for  intervention. 
Emergencies are often seen as temporary events caused by natural disasters and wars and also 
aid agencies make a difference between immediate relief and the more sustained effort of 
development (Duffield, 2007: 40). However, as emergency becomes a precursor to a strategy 
of  development,  it  can  also  become  permanent  as  the  continuing  existence  of  UNRWA 
demonstrates. The narrative of an unpredictable catastrophe that is generated both internally 
and  externally  and  threatens  constantly  evolving  complex  systems,  whether  economic  or 
social in nature, can also be seen as a feature of a neoliberal regime (Dean, 2014: 159).
Dillon & Reid  (2000: 126) argue that each appearance of a complex emergency “reduces 
human life to a zone of indistinction in which it becomes mere stuff for the ordering strategies 
of the hybrid form of sovereign and governmental power that distinguishes the liberal peace 
of global governance”. In this Agambenian “zone of indistinction” bare life does not resist nor 
is it involved in the political sphere of life. It becomes immersed in the camp where, as quoted 
earlier in the section concerning biopolitics, “inhabitants have been stripped of every political 
status and reduced completely to naked life” in “the most absolute biopolitical space that has 
ever  been  realized”  (Agamben,  2000:  41).  But  how  does  the  camp  resonate  with  the 
environment  in  which  UNRWA operates?  Is  its  scope of  power  reliant  on  the  exception 
brought about the permanent state of emergency? 
Refugee camps, spaces where also many of the Palestinian refugees live  (UNRWA, 2016b: 
14), can be seen as maybe the most concrete example of the camp Agamben defined – a 
clearly defined space in which residents are devoid of political participation, remain in a state 
of exception and could be killed on a whim. Following Agier (2008: 62), “refugees are kept in 
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quarantine as a function of the political inability to conceive their place in society as a whole”. 
Agamben himself states that "today's democratico-capitalist project of eliminating the poor 
classes through development not only reproduces within itself the people that is excluded but 
also transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare life” (Agamben, 1998: 101). 
In  humanitarian  imaginary  refugees  become a  speechless  physical  mass  where  instead  of 
being represented as individuals they depict pure suffering and need  (Rajaram, 2002: 251). 
According to Tosa (2009: 423) most of the Palestinians are “placed in outlaw situations” and 
are regarded as homo sacer. These outlaw situations are also described in UNRWA’s most 
recent medium-term strategy for 2016-2021: due to circumstances such as military occupation 
and vague legal status Palestinian refugees can be excluded from aspects of social, economic 
and political life and in many cases they do not enjoy the same level of human rights as other 
citizens (UNRWA, 2016b: 20-22). 
Tosa’s focus is on the situation in Gaza, whereas Hanafi & Long (2010: 14-15) state that the 
same is true to Lebanon – there a Palestinian refugee has “no voice in the legal formulation of 
his or her status and no say in either the Lebanese or Palestinian political processes which 
affect him or her” and the dire urban conditions refugees have to live in are nothing less than 
prison-like. Lebanese camps are spaces where Lebanese law enforcement does not enter and 
though living in them is not mandatory they act as a barrier between refugees and rest of the 
Lebanese population (Ramadan, 2009: 157-158). In Lebanon Palestinian refugees have to face 
legal restrictions that limit their right to work and own property and also curtail their access to 
public services such as education and health (UNRWA, 2015b: 13). 
When studied within an Agambenian framework these restrictions and exclusions can be seen 
as concrete examples of the state of exception he describes. The refugees are not protected by 
similar judicial institutions as the rest of the population. There is also a threat of violence that 
can be exerted on them – military incursions, settler attacks, kidnappings, home demolitions, 
restrictions on movement, forced displacement (UNRWA, 2015b: 14-15). These threats vary 
between UNRWA’s fields of operations and the external factors fuelling them are also not the 
same in all regions. All in all the general picture described by the agency seems very grim 
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indeed and numerous examples of human rights violations and humanitarian emergencies are 
regularly reported7.
This approach is heavily criticised by Tuastad  (2017) in his article on the assumed state of 
exception of Palestinian refugees. He states that UNRWA has actually empowered refugees by 
providing them with “education, an education that was converted into work, work in which 
again  enabled  the  Palestinian  workers  to  pay  tax  to  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]” (Tuastad, 2017: 2167). Concepts of state of exception and bare or sacred life 
are, according to Tuastad, a part of a discursive hegemony in the academic field and act as 
gatekeeping concepts that do not take into account political representation of camp residents 
(Tuastad, 2017: 2166-2167). It can also be said that biopower of the camp is directed towards 
all life, not only bare life  (Oesch, 2017: 118). Moreover, when the blueprint of Agamben’s 
camp is applied similarly to such a wide variety of situations power seems to become absolute 
and differences are ignored  (Revel, 2013: 22). Concrete refugee camps can act as not only 
humanitarian but also political spaces and arguments about what the camp is are evidently 
arguments which address how refugee lives, claims and possibilities are structured (Feldman, 
2015: 251).
This  neglect  of  politics  and  contextual  differences  question  the  validity  of  applying 
Agamben’s concepts in studying (Palestinian) refugees. Also if one is to discuss the forms of 
political agency and subjectivity they barely provide relevance as the endgame is viewing a 
specific population as purely biological life. This act of labelling is not apolitical either. Bare 
life represents a conventional discourse reserved for refugees whereas they also live a political 
life of their own experiences (Hanafi & Long, 2010: 2). Furthermore, as the concrete form of 
refugee camp used to work as a space that suspended politics and could potentially provide a 
private inner space through creating a barrier between the refugee and the society, refugees 
are  now understood  as  an  integral  part  of  the  surrounding environment  and setting  such 
barriers as the camp could hinder their assimilation to the market as well as prevent them 
from exercising freedom and making choices (Duffield, 2019: 64-65). The state of exception 
7 See  for  example  Human  Rights  Watch’s  report  of  events  in  Israel  and  Palestine  in  2017, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/israel/palestine;  Amnesty  on  State  of  Palestine 
2017/2018,  https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/palestine-state-of/report-
palestine-state-of/; Amnesty on Lebanon 2017/2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-
north-africa/lebanon/report-lebanon/;  UNRWA’s  update  on  Syria  from  June  2018, 
https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/syria-unrwa-humanitarian-snapshot-june-2018.
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and emergency are important aspects in legitimising UNRWA’s operations but they serve only 
as a starting point. They necessitate government but are not the ends of human development 
and halting any analysis at the level of identifying bare life misses the ways in which conduct 
of subjects of development is guided. Metaphorical abandonment of the camp allows to grasp 
the  full  extent  of  governmentality  exercised  on  refugees  as  the  catastrophical  imagery 
permeated by constant emergency administers the population through its relationship with the 
external and necessitates the formation of an adaptive subject.
4.2 Vulnerability
As well as framing the spatial reality as something complex, contingent and forever in a state 
of emergency, UNRWA attributes these same qualities to refugees themselves. This potential 
emergency stemming from personal attributes and state of life is represented as vulnerability. 
Both the need for assistance and more vaguely defined vulnerability define what the status of 
a refugee entails. According to UNRWA, even after seventy years refugees still do not have an 
opportunity for means of  living and their  vulnerability  is  still  growing  (UNRWA, 2016b: 
24) and the agency itself “has not been able to do enough in its programmes to adequately 
address vulnerability and persons with increased needs” (UNRWA, 2016b: 28).
In addition to discussing how what kind of subjectivities development programmes wish to 
impose  on the  refugees,  the  initial  definitions  are  also  important  as  they  reflect  why the 
refugees came under specific governmentality to begin with. Right from the beginning of the 
agency’s operations there seems to have been difficulty in establishing which of the refugees 
are to be given assistance and the official description of the refugee became inscribed with 
neediness and victimhood. Instead of giving attention to the whole of the refugee population 
what came to be governed were, as Foucault (1991: 93) has put it, “men in their relations, 
their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of 
subsistence”. What is problematised when a person is given status as a Palestinian refugee is 
not  his  mere  existence  but  the  way  in  which  he  is  able  to  achieve  material  means  of 
subsistence.
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How does UNRWA then define the population cared for? Does it extend its reach to all of 
those  who  fled?  Organised  state  actors,  non-governmental  organisations  and  other 
bureaucratic bodies control the processes by which refugees become socialised with certain 
identities and the structural impacts these identities bring  (Zetter, 1991: 40-41). UNRWA’s 
given definition of a Palestinian refugee is a reflection of that power. It is not as much a legal 
one but serves as operational guidance and determines who can access UNRWA’s services. 
Officially a Palestinian refugee is a person “whose normal place of residence was Palestine 
during  the  period  1 June  1946 to 15 May 1948,  and who lost  both home and means of  
livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict” (UNRWA, 2009a: 3). 
Right from the establishment of UNRWA the definition for a Palestinian refugee was being 
formulated  according  to  their  need  of  relief.  The agency  admitted  that  by  narrowing the 
definition to those in need of assistance they had to leave out deserving people. From early on 
distinctions were made between refugees and refugees in need of assistance – only the latter 
were registered. The agency also made a difference between the type of assistance registered 
refugees needed: rations and services, services, and medical. (Feldman, 2012: 392-394)
In  addition  to  refugees,  also  other  people  can  in  some  cases  be  eligible  to  register  for 
UNRWA’s services or have been able to do so in the past. These groups include “Jerusalem 
poor and Gaza poor” who were resident in either East Jerusalem or Gaza City until 15  May 
1948,  frontier  villagers  who  lived  along  1949  armistice  lines  in  the  West  Bank  and  for 
example lost farming properties because of the conflict, persons of Lebanese origin who were 
temporarily working in Palestine and “who suffered loss of livelihood and hardship as a result 
of the 1948 conflict” (UNRWA, 2009: 31). In many cases these groups of people were kept on 
UNRWA’s relief  rolls even though they did not fully meet the criteria to be registered as 
refugees (UNRWA, 2009: 31). Also spouses of registered refugees and children “receiving 
parental  care  from Registered  Refugees  and  Other  Registered  Persons  under  the  Islamic 
Kafalah system and residing in the household of the Kafalah patron till the age of 18 years” 
are eligible for UNRWA’s services (UNRWA, 2009: 32). 
Leaving out actual refugees from registration rolls and including those who many times were 
not  refugees  per  se  but  suffered  damage  to  their  livelihoods  highlights  how  definitive 
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neediness is in determining who has access to services provided by UNRWA. UNRWA also 
singles out Social Safety Net Cases (SSNC) which include families enrolled in the agency’s 
Social Safety Net Programme (SSNP) meant to deliver services to the poorest aid recipients 
(UNRWA, 2009: 33). Families who have been enrolled to SSNP have general priority for all 
agency services (UNRWA, 2009: 19). Shelter rehabilitation, cash assistance and food rations 
are provisions only available to social safety net cases and other groups are entitled to these 
forms of aid on an ad hoc basis in case of emergencies  (UNRWA, 2009: 20-21). This shift 
from providing universal services to more targeted help has been evident within the agency 
from the 1980s onwards and UNRWA’s relief and social services “have moved from status-
based approach to a poverty-based approach” (de Jong & Aced, 2014: 71-72).
To fit the definition of a refugee it is not enough to flee, but one has to also experience impact 
on the general source of living. This draws a line between categories of refugees and makes a 
judgment of an adequate level of deprivation. Hanafi (2014: 163) argues that UNRWA has 
always understood refugees as needy victims. This assessment is reasonable as UNRWA has 
paired certain type of deprivation and the state of being a refugee together. There cannot be 
one without the other and in the end UNRWA has no other choice but to equal the refugee 
with the needy, the vulnerable and the insecure. This has also led to the inclusion of other 
registered groups to UNRWA’s programmes and highlights the way in which insecurity has 
become to underpin the agency’s  working logic.  Further  differentiations  under  the  Social 
Safety Net Programme follow the same path. 
This performance of labelling gives a glimpse of UNRWA’s field of control, regulation and 
management (Wood, 1985: 343). Drawing distinctions through labels determines who gets aid 
and recognition (Feldman, 2012: 388) but in the other hand it also shapes the demands made 
by those labelled as (Palestinian) refugees and further structures political interests (Zetter, 
1991: 45). Labelling also identifies what makes up the population to be governed and it is a 
necessary  condition  for  the  formation  of  development  as  a  practice  in  governmentality. 
Defining Palestinian refugees necessitated their government and made this new population a 
part of a new, extensive welfare and policing system (Feldman, 2012: 394). This ability to 
decide who is to be helped and who is to be left behind is what defines the sovereignty of an 
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aid  organisation  (Duffield,  2007:  56):  through  its  various  programmes  aimed  at  various 
groups within the refugees UNRWA exercises a concrete power over their lives.
In  contemporary  discussions  on  development  the  one-way  relationship  on  neediness  has 
transformed into  assuming vulnerability.  Vulnerability  can  stem from being a  member  of 
groups such as youth, women, poor, elderly,  disabled (UNRWA, 2016b: 7, 20, 21). These 
groups can be divided even further – into women nursing or pregnant, certain sub-groups of 
youth such as ex-Gazans in Jordan (UNRWA, 2016b: 16, 20).  By being divided into these 
sub-groups refugees have to face a reality in which they move from one potentially dangerous 
stage  of  life  to  another.  Each  is  heralded  with  its  own  problems  that  require  policy 
intervention.
Neither UNRWA’s or UNDP’s accounts of human development provide the reader  with a 
coherent description of vulnerability. Often it is not a measurable quality in itself but instead 
comprises all the potentially negative consequences stemming directly from the potentially 
negative  attributes  a  person can  have and the unfavourable position  in  life  and society a 
person finds himself or herself in. It is a negotiable condition that is not necessarily a product 
of war and displacement as such (Agier, 2011: 150). As Evans & Reid (2014: 45) put it, “the 
subject of vulnerability […] appears to  be both an unending problem to be solved and a 
condition of possibility for modes of living once denied by the regimentation of social states”. 
One specific  group of that has gained significant  attention in UNRWA’s programmes and 
appeals are Palestinian refugees who have resided in Syria and have had to flee again because 
of the ongoing conflict in the country. According to UNRWA’s recent estimates, around 120 
000 of  the  560 000 refugees  registered  in  Syria  have  fled  to  Jordan,  Lebanon and other 
destinations and within Syrian borders 254 000 have been internally  displaced  (UNRWA, 
2018b: ii). The agency has assessed the vulnerability of refugees now residing in Lebanon by 
profiling the population according to  different  sectors:  economy,  education,  food security, 
health, non-food items, protection, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene (UNRWA, 2015a: 6). 
The questionnaire used to conduct the survey includes a wide range of questions aimed at 
evaluating refugees’ living conditions and levels of human development. It takes into account 
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for example the type of toilet facilities families have, the number of times they have had to 
borrow food or rely on another form of help from friends and relatives in the last seven days, 
whether or not any of the family members suffer from chronic diseases such as cancer or 
diabetes  and whether  they  have  goods  such as  kitchen utensils,  beds  and winter  clothes. 
(UNRWA, 2015a: 38-42)
Based on the results  both and overall  vulnerability score and a sector-specific score were 
calculated  and vulnerability  was rated as  either  low,  mild,  moderate  or  severe  (UNRWA, 
2015a: 3). Similar assessments have also been done concerning the refugees who have fled to 
Jordan instead of Lebanon (UNRWA, 2018b: 33). In both cases UNRWA emphasises how its 
humanitarian assistance remains crucial to mitigate the effects of external shocks and keep 
more  people  from  moving  to  a  harsher  category  of  vulnerability  (UNRWA,  2015a:  36; 
UNRWA, 2018b: 33). Assessing vulnerability seems to imply assessing such a wide variety of 
material possessions, social relations and personal attributes that pinpointing any single origin 
of the condition becomes impossible. Instead vulnerability becomes a continuum – a person 
can move from one place on the continuum to another depending on what one owns or how 
one interacts with friends and relatives. It breaks down the category of a refugee and produces 
“a hierarchy of misfortune” (Agier, 2011: 213). 
As stated, these accounts of vulnerability underpin how UNRWA understands not only those 
refugees  now  displaced  due  to  the  war  in  Syria  but  also  everyone  else.  Statements  on 
vulnerability  assume  certain  characteristics  of  the  objects  of  knowledge  or,  following 
Rabinow & Rose (2006: 197), form a “truth discourses about the ‘vital’ character of living 
human beings”. The ever-changing nature of vulnerability and the possibility of dividing it 
further  into  the most  minor  categories  are  not  obstacles  for  operationalising it  as  a  main 
designator of the refugee condition. In his study on Lesotho Ferguson (1994: 255-256) argues 
that  poverty  acts  as  a  point  of  entry  for  efforts  in  development  and  though  various 
programmes may not in the end have on effect on poverty itself, they can end up increasing 
state power and render poverty as an issue that can be solved by technological rather than 
political means. In a similar manner vulnerability serves as a leading principle for intervention 
and due to its vague nature vulnerability effectively labels a whole population.
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5. Governmental rationalities
In  this  chapter  I  will  discuss  the  concepts  of  human  capital  and homo economicus.  The 
discourse of human development includes elements of both concepts and they can act as an 
alternative  way of  discussing governmentality  in  development.  The concepts  also help  in 
answering how development should be undertaken and what are its  expected results.  Ove 
(2013: 318) argues that there exists a “gap in the governmentality literature between studies of 
personal development in the North and studies of international development in the South” and 
indeed, especially the concept of homo economicus is more commonly applied in literature on 
contemporary work and consumption8. Human capital has a more traditional place in the field 
of development as it can be seen as precursor for economic growth and foreign investment9. 
The reason why I have decided to trace these concepts in UNRWA’s papers is that they offer a 
good  perspective  for  analysing  (human)  development  as  an  oeuvre  in  neoliberal 
governmentality.  They  attach  economic  knowledge  to  individual  attributes  despite  human 
development's  claims  of  focusing  not  only  on  economic  growth  and  make  capabilities  a 
problem of becoming involved in value-creation and investment. It can be argued that they 
also are, following Rose’s (1999: 43) terminology, the ways in which people are individuated 
by their governing practices and the relationship to shelf that is urged to be taken up within 
the practices that set the limits of self-government. 
Evans  &  Reid  (2014:  68-70) discuss  demands  made  within  the  discourse  of  sustainable 
development that call for subjects to “adapt to their enabling conditions via the embrace of 
neoliberalism”  by  becoming  resilient,  economic  subjects.  Human  capital  and  homo 
economicus,  when  analysed  within  the  framework  of  human  development,  mirror  the 
functioning  of  resilience  in  sustainable  development  as  means  of  affirming  neoliberal 
8 See  for  example  Fleming,  P.  (2014).  Resisting  work:  The  corporatization  of  life  and  its  discontents. 
Philadelphia:  Temple  University  Press;  McMahon,  J.  (2015).  Behavioral  economics  as  neoliberalism: 
Producing and governing homo economicus. Contemporary Political Theory, 14(2), 137-158; Weidner, J. R. 
(2009). Governmentality, Capitalism, and Subjectivity. Global Society, 23(4), 387-411.
9 For discussion on human development from an economic perspective see for example Hanushek, E. A. 
(2013).  Economic growth in developing countries:  The role of  human capital.  Economics  of  Education  
Review,  37, 204–212; Huay, C. S. & Bani, Y. (2018). Remittances, poverty and human capital: Evidence 
from  developing  countries.  Journal  of  Social  Economics,  45(8),  1227-1235;  Vollrath,  D.  (2014).  The 
efficiency of human capital allocations in developing countries.  Journal of Development Economics,  108, 
106-118.
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governmentality.  If emergency and vulnerability are contingencies in human development, 
something that might but does not need to happen, human capital and homo economicus form 
its potentiality: something that will or should come to being (Alt, 2016: 119).
5.1 Human capital
As neoliberalism entails a massive expansion of the field of economics and attaches economic 
rationality to phenomena ranging from migration to marriage, its reformulations lead to new 
ways in which human beings are made into subjects (Foucault, 2008: 243; Read, 2009: 28). 
One of the outcomes of this governmental rationality is the composition of human capital. In 
this section I will give examples of how UNRWA discusses two of its main service areas, 
health  and  education,  and  how  they  are  connected  to  the  discussion  on  human  capital. 
UNRWA  operates  in  an  environment  where  human  development  goals  are  constantly 
threatened and stalled, but despite external conflicts it takes on a task of internally resolving 
many of the issues at hand.
This focus on investing in human capital forms a key component in the knowledge of political 
economy embedded in neoliberal governmentality. Theory of human capital extends economy 
once again to a previously unexplored territory, human life,  and now dictates it  in purely 
economic terms whereas its was previously thought to be non-economic in nature (Foucault, 
2008: 219). Even though classical political economy had understood that the production of 
goods was depended on land, labour, and capital, labour had previously not attracted specific 
attention and was only evaluated  in  quantitative  terms such as  time,  not  according to  its 
qualitative  properties  (Foucault,  2008:  219-221).  By  bringing  labour  back  into  economic 
analysis neoliberal economics focuses its interest not in the price of labour, what is technically 
produced or how to calculate the value labour adds  (Foucault, 2008: 223). What is studied 
instead is “work as economic conduct practiced, implemented, rationalized, and calculated by 
the  person  who  works”  (Foucault,  2008:  223).  Personal  attributes  and  qualities  become 
discussed in economical terms as capital and furthermore both adding the prefix ‘human’ and 
placing many measures aimed at improving the capital in question to the level of populations 
show  human  capital’s  ultimately  biopolitical  character.  Genetics,  education,  hygiene  and 
healthcare can be used to influence the formation of human capital which is to be preserved 
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and employed for as long as possible  (Foucault, 2008: 227-230). Instead of differentiating 
between wage-earning and reproduction or manual and mental labour, reproduction is now 
part of economy and differences between forms of labour become blurred as the only division 
remaining  is  that  between  “the  precariously  employed  and the  precariously  unemployed” 
(Balibar, 2016: 19).
For Foucault,  the invention of human capital provides a whole new framework of growth 
which is now not simply a matter of physical capital or the number of workers, but directed 
towards something than can be transformed more easily than material realities: “And in fact 
we are  seeing  the  economic  policies  of  all  the  developed countries,  but  also  their  social 
policies, as well as their cultural and educational policies, being orientated in these terms. In 
the same way, the problems of the economy of the Third World can also be rethought on the 
basis of human capital.”  (Foucault, 2008: 232). The shift towards improving human capital 
also echoes Duffield’s (2007) criticism of the way in which (human) development has become 
the paradigm it is today although the concept is far from non-economic. Though Foucault’s 
original genealogy was that of the so-called West, concepts developed have been exported 
elsewhere in the name of development.
The concept of human capital is integral to human development. It is linked to the capabilities 
approach  discussed  earlier  within  the  more  general  theoretical  framework  of  human 
development. Sen (1999: 295) argues that the difference between human capital and human 
capabilities is a valuational one: “The acknowledgement of the role of human qualities in 
promoting and sustaining economic growth - momentous as it is - tells us nothing about why 
economic growth is sought in the first place.” As humans are both the means and ends of 
development, the role of economic growth is linked to expanding freedoms and in a circular 
gesture  it  has  to  be  integrated  into  this  “foundational  understanding  of  the  process  of 
development as the expansion of human capability to lead more worthwhile and more free 
lives” (Sen, 1999: 295). 
According to UNDP, “[i]nvesting in human priorities is intended to reach those who lack 
basic social services such as education and health care that are essential for enhancing human 
capital so that these people can not only be part of inclusive growth, but also enhance their 
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capabilities, which are intrinsically valuable” (UNDP, 2016: 108). In short, human capital is 
not only about economic growth but also widening freedoms. It can have an economic effect 
but its impacts are thought to go beyond commodity production and adding to the value of 
economy (Sen, 1999: 294). 
Building  of  human  capital  as  according  to  UNRWA is  not  far  from  the  logic  Foucault 
describes. The investment in human capital is at the heart of UNRWA’s human development 
policies and its main operating areas of education and healthcare are some of the classical 
examples of human capital’s building materials. Protecting refugee health and reducing their 
disease  burden,  enrolling  children  in  quality,  equitable  and  inclusive  basic  education, 
strengthening refugee capabilities to achieve sustainable livelihoods and ensuring they are 
able  to  meet  their  most  basic  needs  are  key  strategic  outcomes  for  UNRWA  (UNRWA, 
2016b). UNRWA, devoid of national policy tools and faced with the assumed vulnerability of 
the refugee population,  “must  sustain its  investment  in the human capital  of the refugees 
through continued delivery of core services” (UNRWA, 2016b: 5). 
Health, one of the main components of UNRWA’s human development approach, is described 
by the agency as a fundamental right and “[i]n addition to the widely recognized link between 
health and economic growth, achievements in health are instrumental to education outcomes, 
cognitive development, employment opportunities and income-earning potential”  (UNRWA, 
2016b: 34). Reduction in health can lead to reduction in other capabilities, sometimes in an 
irreversible manner  (UNRWA, 2016b: 34). Challenges include general difficulties in service 
provision  due  to  changing  realities  in  the  field  but  also  refugees’ own  behaviour:  their 
unhealthy  lifestyles  such  as  smoking,  improper  diet  and  lack  of  exercise  undermine 
development  (UNRWA, 2016b: 36).  As the refugee population is  ageing the rate  of  non-
communicable diseases such as cancer, diabetes, asthma and cardiovascular diseases is also 
growing (UNRWA, 2016b: 36). 
Education has a central role “in helping individuals live more fulfilled lives, perform better in 
the labour market, improve health, enjoy psychosocial well-being, overcome inequalities, and 
promote  active  citizenship  and peaceful  living”  (UNRWA,  2016b:  39).  In  2011 UNRWA 
began reforming its education program too as it was feared that “students were not developing 
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the types of skills necessary to achieve their full potential and contribute positively to the 
development of their society and the global community” (UNRWA, 2016b: 40). Children are 
nudged to achieve their full potential and students are to become empowered by participating 
in school parliaments (UNRWA, 2016b: 41). 
In conceptualising human capital and its relation to the knowledge of economics, Foucault 
states that with the introduction of human capital its composition and augmentation become 
the measure of real growth (Foucault, 2008: 232). This point of view resonates with the way 
in which human development has tried to distance itself from focusing purely on economic 
growth though in a sense it  has only expanded the field of how different phenomena are 
explained in the grid of economics. For UNRWA health and education are once again both 
ends  and  means  in  a  circle  linking  development,  capabilities,  growth  and  security.  As  a 
conceptual  tool  human  capital  generalises  economic  knowledge  as  the  foundation  for 
governmentality by locating it at the level of the human subject.
This is illustrated by how UNRWA’s strategic outcome aimed at strengthening capabilities and 
providing  the  refugees  with  livelihood  opportunities  is  directly  related  to  health  and 
education: “Sustainable livelihoods emphasize strengths rather than needs, recognizing the 
inherent  potential  of  every person. Health and education as  described above are essential 
dimensions  of  human  development  and  central  to  increased  livelihood  opportunities.” 
(UNRWA, 2016b: 44). By direct interventions through its core programmes, indirectly by jobs 
created  by  the  agency’s  operations  and  by  advocating  refugees’  rights  to  economic 
opportunities UNRWA seeks to contribute to refugee livelihoods (UNRWA, 2016b: 44). 
Closely related to strengthening capabilities and focusing on livelihood opportunities is also 
the strategic outcome of refugees being able to meet their basic needs of food, shelter and 
environmental  health  which  are  all  also  related  to  objectives  of  health  and  education: 
“Safeguarding  [access  to  food]  and  improving  the  nutritional  status  of  individuals  and 
families help to ensure the absence of malnutrition and child stunting and enables human 
productive  capacities  to  be  expended  on  development  needs  such  as  education  and 
livelihoods.”  (UNRWA, 2016b:  49).  Shelters  provide refugees  a  home and “safe drinking 
water, sanitation, drainage, natural lighting, washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse 
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disposal and emergency services” are also essential for ensuring human dignity  (UNRWA, 
2016b: 49). Without these resources human capital and capabilities are not effectively realised 
and  lack  of  access  to  basic  utilities  hinders  refugees  from fully  realising  their  potential. 
Human  capital  thus  becomes  an  all-encompassing  goal  and  similarly  to  vulnerability, 
everything in human life and its relations to the environment ranging from shelter to waste 
disposal can be utilised as targets of intervention.
Probably  one  the  most  formidable  effects  of  integrating  investment  in  human  capital  to 
development is how in order to improve and mould this capital “the problem of the control, 
screening  and  improvement”  (Foucault,  2008:  228)  arise.  It  necessitates  an  extensive 
apparatus that is in charge of fostering the capital in question. UNRWA also monitors itself 
vastly  based  on  how  well  it  performs  in  improving  the  human  capital  of  the  refugee 
population.  Prevalence of diabetes, maternal mortality rate, average daily consultations by 
doctors, percentage of patients with non-communicable diseases who regularly visit a doctor, 
antibiotic prescription rate and hospitalisation rates are some of the health-related issues the 
agency seeks to monitor in its medium-term strategy (UNRWA, 2016b: 64-66). Drop-out rates 
at different levels of education, mean score of students taking part in learning assessments, 
repetition rate in basic education and gaps in student performance levels are in turn assessed 
in education (UNRWA, 2016b: 67-70). 
Although UNRWA states it has managed to provide Palestinian refugees with strong human 
capital,  it  does  not  guarantee  Palestinian  refugees  an  access  to  assets  required  to  further 
improve  them  through  gaining  necessary  coping  strategies  and  resilience  (UNRWA, 
2016b: 46). Here again the agency seems to be in a deadlock as it is left without further tools 
to impact refugee lives. Especially those refugees residing in camps are faced with dismal 
circumstances:  “Due  to  poverty,  unemployment,  increased  population  density  and  a 
deteriorating built  environment,  there is a shortage of adequate housing in camps. This is 
coupled with a lack of regulatory frameworks and planning, which is resulting in a fast rate of 
haphazard urbanization. Services are lacking and social infrastructure is deteriorating. Private 
and common spaces are not differentiated any more, which results in the abuse of privacy. 
Social problems are increasing. Isolation and social segregation are serious problems facing 
refugees living in many camps.” (UNRWA, 2016b: 46). 
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This assessment shows how human capital  according to UNRWA is not enough to ensure 
complete development amongst the refugees and how it is produced in a constant state of 
potential  emergency.  As  external  political  constraints  always  have  an  effect  on  how  the 
agency is able to execute its programmes and what kind of circumstances Palestinian refugees 
themselves live in the investment in human capital fails to put in motion the kind of positive 
effects its proponents anticipate. Duffield (2007: 188; 2010: 57) speaks of containing global 
surplus population or the global poor. This notion of containment can also be applied to the 
way in which UNRWA currently has to take action as despite its  significant influence on 
Palestinian refugees its political impact is limited by its mandate and expectations from its 
donors. The formation of human capital is a desirable result of human development and as 
such one of the fundamental principles of UNRWA but the capacities this capital should foster 
cannot, at least in the Palestinian case, be fully implemented in practice.
5.2 Homo economicus
Homo  economicus  is  an  essential  figure  to  understand  the  goals  of  UNRWA’s  human 
development goals. The more commonly applied characterisation of Agamben’s homo sacer 
does not capture the essence of governmentality in development. Homo economicus in the 
other hand can be used as a general guidance in order to understand what kind of subjects are 
to be produced and how agency is to be constructed in contemporary human development 
approaches. In UNRWA’s case it offers a more comprehensive outlook on how the refugee is 
understood,  not  only  as  a  victim  but  a  economic  agent  amenable  through  development 
interventions.  Following  Alt  (2016:  132),  subjects  of  neoliberal  governmentality  can  be 
described as “subjects with as of yet unfulfilled capabilities that need to be realised in order 
for them to be able to live valuables lives”.
Homo economicus can be seen as the rational ends of investing in human capital. Adequate 
human capital is understood to equip the subject with capabilities that will further enlarge the 
subject’s  freedom.  If  governmentality  is  understood  also  as  a  technique  of  the  self,  the 
question of the subject championed by human development is an essential figure to discuss. 
What emerges from proper human capital is the subject of homo economicus:
47
“Homo œconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. This is true to the 
extent that, in practice, the stake in all neoliberal analyses is the replacement every 
time  of  homo  œconomicus  as  partner  of  exchange  with  a  homo  œconomicus  as 
entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own 
producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.”
(Foucault, 2008: 226)
Foucault  makes  a  difference  between  the  liberal  subject  of  exchange  and  this  neoliberal 
subject of competition who, through consumption, participates in an entrepreneurial activity 
on the basis of acquired capital and in the end produces something for his own satisfaction 
(Foucault, 2008: 226). This entrepreneurship or competition can be understood in a broader 
sense  than  something  related  to  purely  economic  activity  or  something  located  between 
individuals and their surroundings. It has become necessary to the inner life of the individual 
and adoption of this kind of entrepreneuship is a part of the process of creating subjects of 
governmentality. Dardot & Laval (2017: 256-260) argue that the subject emerging as a result 
of neoliberal governmentality is unitary as opposed to the previous modern subject who was 
able to inhabit several regimes and registers: the spheres of religion, political sovereignty and 
commodity exchange. Neoliberalism is however “characterized by a homogenization of the 
discourse of man around the figure of the enterprise” (Dardot & Laval, 2017: 259). 
Returning to an earlier assessment by Dean (2010: 43), governmentality incites certain forms 
of  identity  and  assigns  various  duties  and  forms  of  conducts  for  its  subjects.  Human 
development, as a “process of increasing the ability of people to make decisions affecting 
their  own lives”  (UNRWA, 2016b: 13),  acts as a framework in which these identities are 
imagined and duties consigned. A population that is well-educated, healthy and is comprised 
of individuals who are capable of becoming autonomous, calculative and reflexive is able to 
generate development in itself and provides an adequate workforce  (Shani, 2012: 108).This 
approach  is  visible  in  UNRWA’s  medium-term strategy.  Desired  outcomes  in  health  and 
education  are  directly  linked  with  opportunities  for  employment  and  refugees’ ability  to 
sustain their own lives amidst challenging circumstances.
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One of  UNRWA’s strategic  outcomes  is,  as  mentioned  also  earlier,  strengthening  refugee 
capabilities for increased livelihood opportunities  (UNRWA, 2016b: 44). Livelihood can be 
described as a means of securing basic necessities of life, be it employment or other possible 
coping strategies. Furthermore, livelihoods are to be sustainable which entails a livelihood to 
be  able  to  “cope  with  and  recover  from stress  and  shocks  and  maintain  or  enhance  its 
capabilities and assets both now and in the future” (UNRWA, 2016b: 44). Unemployment is 
however a persistent issue for the agency: “With unemployment rising, economic engagement 
of  Palestine  refugees  is  of  concern  across  all  fields.  In  particular,  high  rates  of  youth 
unemployment, especially affecting female youth, and low labour force participation rates for 
women, ranging between 10 and 18 per cent across UNRWA fields, will remain the most 
significant livelihood challenges for Palestine refugees.” (UNRWA, 2016b: 45). As discussed 
in the section concerning human capital, refugees have not been able to become employed in 
large  numbers  as  other  forms  of  capital,  social,  natural,  physical,  and  financial,  are 
inadequately available (UNRWA, 2016b: 46).
Just as in every other area of UNRWA’s operations, refugee livelihoods are affected by local 
and regional  conflicts  but  even during conflicts  the  agency “will  give particular  focus  to 
promoting employment and income-generating opportunities for refugees” (UNRWA, 2016b: 
46).  Employment  and the  ability  to  earn a  living  are  regarded as  important  factors  in  to 
surviving  and  recovering  from  conflicts,  both  at  the  level  of  the  individual  and  the 
surrounding community  (UNRWA, 2016b: 44). It should be noted that UNRWA is itself a 
significant  employer.  It  has  30 000 full-time employees  that  are  refugees  and though the 
agency states that providing employment opportunities directly is not its main objective (as 
opposed to the works programme in place earlier), the salaries paid “represent an injection of 
income into refugee and other local communities” (UNRWA, 2016b: 45). 
The focus on employability  serves as an example of how UNRWA’s human development 
approach is not free from economic calculations. Both education and health are framed in 
terms of employment prospects and the capabilities achieved through them become attributes 
of homo economicus. There is again a cyclical connection between human development and 
employability: employment is necessary for human development to take place as loss of jobs 
can have a negative impact on health and education indicators (UNRWA, 2016b: 19). At the 
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same  time  health  is  necessary  for  refugees  to  gain  employment  and  “income-earning 
potential” (UNRWA, 2016b: 34) while also education is needed to perform better in the labour 
market and gain paid employment (UNRWA, 2016b: 39). Separating these desired outcomes 
from each other  becomes impossible  as they are dependent  on each other  and work in  a 
similar manner of focusing on economic activity. Human development goals become valuable 
through their potential economic operationalisation and they are not necessarily prescribed 
objective value without this connection. 
As employment is not easily realised and refugees have to face a hostile environment, they 
can also be viewed as trapped in precarity. It “denotes a condition in which the casualization, 
informalization  or  unpredictability  of  work  coexists  with  economic  vulnerability, 
environmental uncertainty and an openness to surprise and shocks”  (Duffield,  2019: 115). 
According  to  Duffield,  in  the  South  growing  precarity  and  changing  forms  of  work  are 
focused on the informal sector that could potentially promote new forms of economic action 
and be integrated to the global market as such, without transitioning through guarantees of 
stable employment, housing and jobs that were previously enjoyed by the global North but 
have now declined (Duffield, 2019: 121-126). If precarity is accepted as the guiding principle 
regarding prospects of employment and the way of existing in the labour market to begin 
with, it requires a specific set of abilities and refining potentials to become able to embrace 
itself. It is the economic reality homo economicus has to face and be able to perform in.
Homo economicus of human development is a figure who shares a personal responsibility in 
building human capital as opposed to leaving its formation solely in the hands of external 
institutions.  Accumulation  of  human  capital  then  creates  an  abilities-machine  capable  of 
producing income through investment (Foucault, 2008: 229). Duffield (2010; 2007) criticises 
development  policies  as  according to  him,  people living in  less-developed countries  have 
often been viewed as traditionally self-reliant and at least self-reliance is something they are 
nudged to achieve through development interventions. It does not however mean that the goal 
of development programmes or agencies would be to keep their distance from the population 
governed. On the contrary, constant interventions are needed as the emergency never seems to 
cease and maintaining human capital requires certain service structures. Homo economicus is 
a  subject  who,  despite  the requirement  of  internalising  governmentality,  also needs  to  be 
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screened and monitored just as the components necessary to maintain his condition. In the 
case  of  refugees,  whose  status  is  defined  by  various  contingencies,  their  exclusion  as 
vulnerable and temporary “commands a cure and musters a therapy; they clearly need to be 
helped ‘back in’ as soon as possible” (Bauman, 2007: 31). 
Still, it would be incorrect to state that self-sufficiency plays no part in human development as 
already the drive towards employment is one illustration of it as a goal. But to construct the 
homo economicus it  requires,  once again,  active  capacity-building  also  from the refugee. 
Even if the goal of getting back in might be distant or even impossible, be it for the literal 
absence of employment or other opportunities for income, under conditions of precarity one 
should at least be actively unemployed (Duffield, 2019: 118) and remain productive despite 
being  part  of  the  non-labouring  surplus  population  (Rajaram,  2018:  633).  Passivity  is  an 
undesired quality that should be replaced with constant work on the self in order to retain 
some level of self-sufficiency and save valued human capital from deterioration.
In  addition  to  providing  necessary  services,  UNRWA also  anticipates  certain  forms  of 
conduct. Capabilities mean that the refugees themselves take advantage of the opportunities 
provided  (UNRWA, 2016b: 7) and actually exercise the capacities build  (UNRWA, 2016b: 
13). In an environment which is constantly under threat homo economicus assumes a certain 
responsibility  over  his  own  life  through  various  calculations.  Through  guidance  and 
counselling, children are prepared to answer “one of the more important choices in life: what 
to do after school” (UNRWA, 2016b: 44). Refugees should aspire for higher education and be 
encouraged towards voluntarism  (UNRWA, 2016b: 45). Through education and promotion 
they  can  also  strive  for  behavioural  change  that  enhances  both  their  mental  well-being 
(UNRWA, 2016b: 36)  and physical health  (UNRWA, 2016b: 37). Psychosocial intervention 
could also “strengthen their ability to protect themselves” (UNRWA, 2015b: 8). 
It  is not the capacities alone that constitute homo economicus but the ability to use these 
capacities in a way that is deemed desirable and that fits within the framework of neoliberal 
governmentality. In this context human development becomes also an internal project. David 
Chandler criticises this approach heavily by referring to the texts of Amartya Sen: 
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“Sen is essentially seeking to measure the internal or moral life of the subject and 
arguing that this should be the actual object of policy making and also the indirect 
means of measuring the extent of ‘freedom’. The internal capacities of individuals are 
revealed only in relation to the choices which they make, in their own understandings 
of  their  own needs  and  interests.  Subjects  which  lack  the  capacities  for  adequate 
choice-making therefore reveal their lack of ‘freedom’.”
 (Chandler, 2013: 17)
It could be added that through the internalisation of development the subject can learn what 
choices to make as in the end not all choices are valued equally. This is evident in UNRWA’s 
texts as one of its motives is to educate people in making and valuing the correct ones which 
are  seen  as  ingredients  of  further  development  and  self-sufficient  freedom.  The  subjects 
emerging from human development are able “to adapt and to become resilient as agents of 
their own development”  (Chandler, 2013: 18). Entrepreneurial action, risk management and 
individual  responsibility  are  necessary for  people to  gain abilities  to  cope with risks  and 
insecurities (Lemke, 2014: 65).
Returning to  Foucault,  elements of homo economicus are  not everything that constitute  a 
subject but they make the subject governmentalisable and provide “the surface of contact 
between the individual and the power exercised on him”  (Foucault, 2008: 252-253). Homo 
economicus  responds  to  artificial  changes  in  environment  in  a  systematic  manner  and 
becomes correlative to  governmentality  which modifies  the environment  and its  variables 
(Foucault,  2008:  270-271).  Under  neoliberalism  this  subject  of  development  can  realise 
maximal utility by acquiring capacities that benefit him or her over others who also compete 
in the same market (Alt, 2016: 124). Homo economicus is by no means a passive subject as 
the constant state of emergency does not allow that: instead, one can always strive to reach a 
new  potentiality  and  change  adjusting  to  the  environment  without  questioning  why  the 
environment is changing to begin with (Alt, 2016: 125). 
This notion of not striving to change the environment or addressing root causes of an infinite 
emergency can be interpreted as a practice that forbids other forms of political agency than 
those realised under neoliberal governmentality. The freedom a subject can practice is the 
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freedom of  exposing itself  “to  danger  on behalf  of  itself  and that  population  to  which it 
contributes” (Evans & Reid, 2014: 64). Even though the mode of governmentality at stake is 
heavily depended on the idea of mainstreaming economics throughout both the social and 
individual body, the form of economics in human development is not – as its theories suggest 
themselves  – only economics of employment rates,  measurable productivity  and financial 
calculations. As Evans & Reid (2014: 66) phrase it, “the concept of economy is merely one 
powerful and important discourse within which liberal understandings of the nature of life, as 
such,  operates  [sic]”.  When  homo economicus  is  understood  in  its  Foucauldian  sense  as 
something that  marks  how and where power,  the cluster  of  mutual  relationships  between 
various  actors,  is  exercised  it  forms  the  site  for  negotiations  characterised  by  a  certain 
knowledge of how life is to be conducted.
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6. Risk and dissent
In this chapter I will discuss a different way of understanding refugee positions and identities, 
both by UNRWA and refugees themselves. As noted earlier, governmentality can be described 
“the  ensemble  formed  by  the  institutions,  procedures,  analyses  and  reflections,  the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power,  which  has  as  its  target  population,  as  its  principal  form  of  knowledge  political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault, 1991: 102). 
It can be argued that development is closely connected to security (Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 
2007, 2010; Reid, 2013) and following Dillon’s  (2007: 46) understanding of a biopolitical 
dispositif of security as something focused on population and concerned with contingencies 
arising  from  human  life,  human  development  can  viewed  as  a  biopolitical  dispositif  of 
security in itself. 
The concern with human contingencies and potentialities are at the heart of UNRWA’s human 
development strategy and in order to navigate in this landscape the refugee is to be governed 
and self-governed as homo economicus capable of improvement and economic rationality. 
Refugees are however also a potential source of danger and always marked with an inherent 
risk of turning to undesired behaviour. This understanding of refugees as a risk then acts as 
one  of  the  objectives  for  UNRWA’s  interventions  and  intertwines  with  the  conditions  of 
emergency and vulnerability. In many cases undesired behaviour has been realised in the form 
of demonstrations and other protests which can be interpreted as an alternative subjectivity to 
the conduct promoted by neoliberal governmentality. These events mark a rupture from the 
role of a vulnerable victim and include political dimensions not present when the refugee is 
rendered to a subject of development and humanitarianism (Agier, 2016: 153-154). 
6.1 Dangerous refugees
UNRWA’s documents include various references to potential risks, how they might be avoided 
and  how  they  could  be  realised.  In  the  chapter  concerning  conditions  for  UNRWA’s 
government the notion of bare life or homo sacer was presented as one way of understanding 
refugees’ biopolitical existence. Addressing UNRWA and human development from the angle 
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of governmentality however allows to investigate another mechanism at stake through which 
also vulnerability acts: refugees present a risk that is contained through agency efforts. As 
Foucault  (2009: 61) notes, “risks are not the same for all individuals, all ages, or in every 
condition, place or milieu. There are therefore differential risks that reveal, as it were, zones 
of higher risk and, on the other hand, zones of less or lower risk”. UNRWA carries out its own 
risk assessments by identifying various potential dangers that characterise refugee lives and 
implementing  various  human development  efforts  to  halt  these  risks  from being realised. 
Many techniques of human development can be understood as attempts in risk management. 
What becomes the source of risk is human life in itself – all ages, levels of health and family 
formations  can  be  placed  on  a  continuum of  vulnerability  and  therefore  they  also  carry 
potential for danger.
Risky and dangerous behaviour are unwanted attributes that oppose the desired refugee figure. 
UNRWA admits that it is alone unable to solve many of the underlying political issues that 
present obstacles to human development and human rights:
“If the underlying problems are not addressed, the consequences will be manifold: a 
continuation  of  reduced  livelihood  opportunities  and  dashed  hopes  for  another 
generation of Palestine refugee children and youth. Without change, the population – 
susceptible  to  impoverishment,  embitterment  and isolation  – may resort  to  actions 
with implications for host communities and countries in the region.” 
(UNRWA, 2016b: 24)
Risks related to the agency’s underfunding, also an issue that is not only in the hands of the 
agency, are likewise seen as potential causes for undesired behaviour amongst the refugees 
through impacts of underfunding on all areas of UNRWA’s services. Underfunding could lead 
to  increased  class-sizes  and  lesser  teaching  materials,  shortage  of  essential  medicine 
provision, reduction of doctor-patient consultation times, fewer shelter rehabilitation projects, 
less emergency assistance and poorer water quality control. These outcomes could then halt 
improvements  in  all  areas  ranging  from  education  to  shelter  improvement,  hazardous 
infrastructure that can pose life-threatening situations, decline in the numbers of abject poor 
that are able to benefit from emergency assistance and hospitalisation support. Eventually the 
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agency fears that further down the line life-expectancy, school years, employment rates and 
food security levels could then reduce and risks for dangerous behaviour amongst the refugees 
could rise. (UNRWA, 2016b: 56)
The above summary illustrates the variety of components that are involved in managing risks. 
Effectively  all  the  elements  that  are  needed  to  achieve  an  adequate  level  of  human 
development, be it teaching materials, vaccinations or house improvement, can be utilised to 
reduce  risks.  Education,  health,  material  living  standards  and  more  general  economic 
conditions are all now attached to security. As Foucault describes security: “New elements are 
constantly being integrated: production, psychology, behavior, the ways of doing things of 
producers,  buyers,  consumers,  importers,  and  exporters,  and  the  world  market.  Security 
therefore involves organizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.” 
(Foucault, 2009: 45).
One  of  the  internal  risks  UNRWA  discusses  in  its  reports  are  potential  protests  and 
demonstrations carried out by refugees. Not only are the refugees able to resort to actions that 
could impact  countries  in  the region,  their  actions can target  the agency itself  too.  In  its 
emergency appeals  UNRWA outlines  different  risks  specific  to  certain regions  as  well  as 
instructs how to cope with them if the risks are realised. Many of the risks are linked to the 
adequacy of services provided to  the refugees  and the refugees’ own perceptions  of how 
UNRWA is assisting them. In Syria,  risks include “higher expectation from refugees than 
UNRWA capacity and mandate allows for” which could lead to increased complaints as well 
as demonstrations and “unfavourable social media coverage” (UNRWA, 2018b: 49). A similar 
scenario  is  mentioned  in  the  Occupied  Palestinian  Territory  Emergency  Appeal  2018:  if 
“beneficiary expectations go unmet due to  perceived (or actual)  decrease in  humanitarian 
assistance” the consequences could include damage to UNRWA’s reputation within its donors 
as  well  as  “mistrust  towards  UNRWA among  Palestine  refugees  who  do  not  receive  the 
expected support” (UNRWA, 2018a: 31-32). Cutbacks in agency’s services could also lead to 
dissatisfaction amongst UNRWA’s employees who might then misuse materials and assets as 
well as take “industrial action” (UNRWA, 2018a: 31). Unfavourable community relationships 
might begin to take form (UNRWA, 2018a: 32), market volatilities could force the agency to 
“reduce the scope of activities or adjust the number of beneficiaries” (UNRWA, 2018a: 33), 
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and operational difficulties could lead to generally both a constant feeling of insecurity and a 
generally low morale (UNRWA, 2018b: 49).
These scenarios are not purely imaginary as changes in UNRWA’s policies and implementing 
new programs have often been met with criticism form the refugees themselves and have 
sometimes sparked even violent reactions. UNRWA’s annual reports are littered with mentions 
of various strikes and protests: for example in 2013 agency vehicles were blocked by PLO’s 
camp  services  committees  in  the  West  Bank  to  protest  changes  in  agency  programming 
(UNRWA, 2014: 19) and as many as 94 protests were organised in the Gaza Strip because of 
cuts in assistance (UNRWA, 2014: 21).  In 2014 the number of protests in Gaza climbed to 
184 (UNRWA, 2015c: 22) and during the same year UNRWA installations in Lebanon were 
closed  for  150  days  because  of  civil  unrest  and  demonstrations  held  by  “discontented 
beneficiaries” (UNRWA, 2015c: 24).
These reactions are not new. The quote below depicts “the morale of the refugee” just a few 
years after the initial displacement:
“This sense of injustice, frustration and disappointment has made the refugee irritable 
and unstable. There are occasional strikes, demonstrations and small riots. There have 
been demonstrations over the census operation, strikes against the medical and welfare 
services,  strikes  for  cash  payments  instead  of  relief,  strikes  against  making  any 
improvements, such as school buildings, in camps in case this might mean permanent 
resettlement; experimental houses to replace tents, erected by the Agency, have been 
torn down; and for many months, in Syria and Lebanon, there was widespread refusal 
to  work on agency road-building and afforestation  schemes.  This  then  is  rich and 
tempting soil  for  exploitation by those with other  motives  than the welfare of  the 
refugee.”
(UNRWA, 1951: 5)
In many cases the motivations for protests seem to be connected to problems arising from the 
refugee  status  itself.  UNRWA has  in  some cases  been  accused  of  denying  the  refugees’ 
demands for  their  right  of  return  and possible  reimbursements.  The reason for  refusal  to 
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participate in the works program in the 1950s was for example driven by this fear (UNRWA, 
1951: 6). A more contemporary reflection of these fears is the opposition against UNRWA’s 
camp  improvement  programme  established  in  2006.  Structural  improvements  in  refugee 
camps have often been opposed as they also are seen as a sign of permanent resettlement (Al 
Husseini & Bocco, 2010: 263).  Misselwitz & Hanafi  (2010) write extensively on attitudes 
towards the improvement  programme that  include both the fear of “normalisation” of the 
refugee situation as well as more pragmatic approaches that view the issue not so much as a 
political  problem but  a  developmental  one.  As one camp resident  explains  in  the  article: 
“There are some in the camp who seek to politicize everything for their own benefit, to show 
how important they are. We should be careful not to reject those projects that will help our  
women and children live in better conditions.” (Misselwitz & Hanafi, 2010: 366). 
Assistance  cuts  in  Gaza  in  2013,  briefly  mentioned  in  an  earlier  paragraph,  exemplify  a 
different side of the issue of refugee status and rights. In 4th of April 2013 demonstrators broke 
into  UNRWA compounds  after  their  cash  assistances  had  been  suspended  due  to  budget 
shortage (UNRWA, 2013). Protestors held banners demanding a “dignified life” and the chief 
of the local refugee committee stated that the protestors would keep on advocating “for the 
rights of the refugees” (UNRWA, 2013). Because of the break-in UNRWA decided to close all 
of  its  relief  and distribution  centres  and demanded that  all  factions  behind the  event  “to 
immediately stop inciting crowds at  these demonstrations and to conduct themselves in  a 
responsible manner” (Omer, 2013). 
In a similar manner, a reduction in aid led to tensions in Lebanon in 2016. In the beginning of  
the  year  the  agency  made  changes  to  its  healthcare  policies  in  order  to  achieve  “greater 
efficiency” due to challenges in high prices of hospitalisations  (UNRWA, 2013). In practice 
this meant that UNRWA decided to abandon free secondary healthcare and instead refugees 
would have to pay a certain percentage, ranging from five to 20 percent, of their hospital costs 
(Ashly, 2016). This led to wide demonstrations that lasted for months. All of the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon were affected and the protests  took on many forms:  UNRWA 
offices were blockaded, a man called Omar Khudeir set himself on fire outside an agency-run 
healthcare  clinic,  another  man  Haitham  al-Gazi  declared  a  hunger  strike  and  many  of 
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UNRWA’s premises were effectively closed for four months (Ashly, 2016;  UNRWA, 2016a: 
6). 
Eventually the new policies were revised. The agency’s own coverage of secondary healthcare 
costs  were  adjusted  to  90-100%  and  a  Medical  Hardship  Fund  became  operational  to 
subsidise healthcare costs of refugees living in abject poverty  (UNRWA, 2016c). This is in 
line with the agency’s current medium-term strategy which states that “in its hospitalization 
subprogramme, UNRWA will direct focus and accord highest priority to those refugees with 
life-threatening illnesses requiring life-saving/life-supporting medical care, but who lack the 
necessary financial assets or insurance coverage to attain such treatment” (UNRWA, 2016c). 
This statement follows the logic of distributing aid to those most in need and generating a 
division of sub-groups amongst refugees themselves. It is not being a refugee in itself that 
necessarily grants access to services but rather the level of vulnerability and lack of self-
sufficiency of each individual.
These demonstrations and risk assessments highlight the ambivalent and mutual relationship 
between the agency and the population it  is  mandated to take care of.  UNRWA seeks to 
protect the refugees from external chaos and their own dangerous behaviour. At the same time 
refugees present a risk to the agency itself as discontent is feared to have a negative impact on 
the general public image of the agency. They also signal that in many ways the stand-offs 
between UNRWA and refugees seem to revolve around a struggle on definitions. What is the 
state of being a refugee like? Is it a temporary condition, what are the refugees entitled to, 
how are they to express their concerns? 
6.2 Alternative subjectivities
For  UNRWA  the  refugee  condition  is  unsustainable  and  urgent  solutions  are  needed 
(UNRWA,  2016b:  7).  In  the  meantime  the  agency  continues  it  actions  in  development, 
reforms various fields of assistance, updates policies, widens its mandate and still remains in 
operation after decades. Demonstrations and other actions towards the agency discussed in the 
previous  section  show  that  the  relationship  between  UNRWA  and  refugees  is  not 
straightforward and many of the recent confrontations have been a result of different views on 
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development efforts. Attitudes towards developmental programmes and aid are linked to the 
ways in which refugee condition itself is understood and what claims can be made from that 
position. 
When  discussing  Palestinian  history  and events  preceding  the  war  in  1967  Edward Said 
(1992: 132) defines refugee sentiments towards UNRWA in the following manner: “UNRWA 
stood for nonpolitical paternalism represented by doled-out food, clothing, as well as medical 
and educational facilities. UNRWA’s charitable concern for the Palestinians’ political disaster 
seemed reducible to sterile figures – how many mouths to feed, how many bodies to clothe 
and treat, etc.” The agency was not set up to provide a political alternative for Palestinian 
refugees in exile, a role which was undertaken by actors such as PLO that seemed to provide a 
better way to channel national and refugee concerns (Said, 1992: 131-136). UNRWA has also 
been accused of focusing its attention on a politically neutralised approach of empowerment 
through social development and turning attention away from refugees' current political crises 
and  their  condition's  historical  origins  (Allan,  2014:  14).  From  the  perspective  of 
humanitarian and development agencies the right way of being a refugee is preparing for not 
being a refugee and to work towards resettlement, self-reliance and becoming an object of 
development (Feldman, 2015: 245).
During its long existence UNRWA and aid provided have also taken a somewhat different 
role.  As  illustrated  by  the  demonstrations  that  have  taken  place  during  planned  cuts  in 
assistance,  aid is not an apolitical  issue.  In her ethnographic study on Palestinian refugee 
camps  in  Lebanon  Peteet  (2005:  76-81)  argues  that  education,  housing  and  rations  have 
become  a  symbol  of  refugees’ difficult  relationship  with  UN  institutions  and  a  constant 
reminder  of  their  situation  embodied  by  economic  marginality,  landlessness,  absence  of 
citizenship  –  put  shortly,  refugeeness.  Persisting  as  a  refugee  until  return  can  serve  as  a 
symbol for national claims and anticipate future liberation (Feldman, 2015: 245). In this light 
it is understandable why reductions in services have received strong opposition. Through its 
operations UNRWA serves as a legitimation for refugees’ claims and grants them a space in 
international politics.
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Instead of focusing on potential depoliticisation of human development, it can also be said 
that  UNRWA plays  an  important  role  as  a  way  of  legitimising  the  right  of  return  and 
validating the identity of the refugees through its claims for a just solution to the ongoing 
situation  (Al  Husseini  &  Bocco,  2010:  276-278;  Bocco,  2010:  237).  In  their  survey  Al 
Husseini and Bocco (2010: 278) found out that registering with the UNRWA was important 
mostly because it guarantees a proof of refugee status, not only because it allows access to the 
agency's services. As discussed earlier, right after its establishment UNRWA did not register 
Palestinians who had been forced to leave their homes during the war in 1948 but lacked the 
characteristics of material vulnerability. Relief provided by UNRWA was regarded as a right 
and according to  the  agency therefore seen  as  inadequate despite  attempts  to  explain  the 
situation: “the refugee will listen politely but in the end remains convinced both of the bitter 
injustice done to him, and the fact that little or nothing is being done to rectify it” (UNRWA, 
1951: 51). Refugee status can serve as a position from which one can make political claims 
and as those claims are not met,  one is  left  only with attempts of mitigation that  do not 
address political problems. 
How  should  one  understand  these  contradictions  and  dissatisfactions?  The  recipients  of 
UNRWA's services have not developed a depoliticised and ahistorical mentality (Al Husseini, 
2010: 9; Al Husseini & Bocco, 2010: 268). As the agency’s medium-term strategy states, it is 
“a  living  reminder  of  what  happens when no political  solutions  are  found to  address  the 
underlying causes of  a  situation of  historic  injustice”  (UNRWA, 2016b:  21).  The refugee 
status administered by UNRWA and aid received as a registered refugee can themselves be 
politically important. If aid, be it in the form of food ratios or cash assistance, is seen as a 
validator  of  refugees’ claims  reducing  them  could  also  disqualify  Palestinian  refugees  a 
specific political category.
This  way  of  conceiving  UNRWA and  the  implications  of  its  services  is  contrary  to  the 
approach analysed through the figure of homo economicus. Instead of seeing refugee status as 
a precursor to developmental attempts of endless capacity-building, adaptation to emergency 
and maximisation of entrepreneurial human capital, it could also become as a starting point 
for  another  set  of  actions.  Following Lemke  (2014:  64) who states  that  under  liberalism 
“freedom is not the (negative) right of individuals to confront power, but the positive effect of 
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governmental  action”  it  could  be  stated  that  similarly  in  government  through  human 
development the priced goal of freedom is not open ended but rather should be conducted in a 
limited manner following the inner rationales of neoliberal governmentality. Demonstrations, 
strikes and other forms of dissent are clearly not the kind of behaviour that the agency would 
expect from the refugees especially if they are targeted against UNRWA itself and as such 
they  stand  as  a  stark  contrast  to  the  endless  adaptability  of  the  ideal  subject  of  human 
development.
As established earlier, UNRWA’s government is based on the inescapability of emergency and 
vulnerability. Due to this environment and the nature of being a refugee, being situated in a 
prolonged temporality, expressions of disagreement and demands are exercised in a peculiar 
sphere of humanitarianism – as if they were questions of citizenship but forever locked in a 
reality that knows the body of the vulnerable and not that of a citizen  (Agier, 2016: 152). 
Following  this  trail  of  analysis  human  development  knows  both  vulnerability  and  the 
economic man who exists within the limits prescribed by neoliberal governmentality instead 
of striving to alter his or her conditions or ask for anything else than the role assigned. Dissent 
creates  a  political  momentum that  that  acts  beyond the temporality  of  refugeeness.  Agier 
(2016: 152-153) differentiates between the short time of the subject,  the here and now of 
refugee camps that can also be stretched beyond the spatial borders of a camp, and the long 
time of the subject which takes into account political meanings and historical contexts.
According to Agamben, the refugee marks the distinction between the human and the citizen. 
In a modern nation-state there is no space for bare life and therefore the refugee status is also 
considered  to  be  only  temporary:  sooner  or  later  the  refugee  well  be  either  repatriated, 
integrated or resettled (Agamben, 1998: 77-78; Malkki, 1995: 505). Agamben (2000: 19–22) 
suggests that the refugee can be viewed as a limit concept that calls into question the current 
divisions and categories of the nation-state – yet in the case of Palestinian refugees even 
acquiring citizenship does not make them lose their refugee status (Khalil, 2011: 687; Oesch, 
2017: 110-111). This is also how biopolitics and governmentality become entangled: life as 
such requires a site for government to become incorporated into a relationship of power. 
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When discussing the figure of the refugee, one could also flip the questioning of temporality 
around and ask what it means “to be, or to remain, emplaced” (Malkki, 1995): 515). Despite 
UNRWA’s statements on finding a durable solution for the refugees it targets only the short, 
individualised time whereas refugee claims on aid and dignity could be interpreted as working 
on  a  completely  different  scale.  They  constitute  aid  as  something  else  than  a  tool  for 
biopolitical  subjectification  and  human  development.  Following  both  Malkki  (1995)  and 
Agier  (2016),  actions  undertaken  to  oppose  UNRWA bring  the  politics  back  in  to  its 
operations  by  contemplating  refugee  agency  in  different  terms  and  departing  from  the 
rationalities embedded in neoliberal governmentality which does not have the vocabulary to 
comprehend such agency beyond its own apparatus.
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7. Conclusions
In the final chapter of my thesis I want to both recap earlier analysis and discuss its general 
utility. During the process of analysing sources and selecting literature I have constantly been 
intrigued by the multiple ways UNRWA can be addressed. Even if its programmes can be 
analysed from the theoretical framework chosen in this thesis, it does not fall neatly into any 
predestined category or allow for straightforward analysis. As UNRWA is an exception in the 
refugee regime similar rules do not apply for Palestinian refugees registered by UNRWA and 
other people facing displacement (Goddard, 2010; Khalil, 2011). Questions of citizenship for 
example then have a different effect on Palestinian refugees. As the agency has been working 
for  decades  and  changed  its  policies  from  emergency  humanitarian  relief  to  human 
development it cannot be compared only from the perspective of managing refugees either – 
this is where various accounts on development also have to be addressed. And as accounts on 
biopolitics  can  vary  greatly  depending  on  whether  the  subject  of  study is  understood  as 
refugeeness  encompassed  by  an  immediate  emergency  or  long-term  development  of 
populations,fusing both can create even more ambivalences.
Instead of an immediate emergency necessitating short-term disaster relief and humanitarian 
aid  UNRWA’s  operations  can  now be  said  to  be  depended  on a  constant  emergency.  As 
comprehensive resolutions on how Palestinian refugees should be resettled and reimbursed 
and whether or not they have an undivided right of return to the areas left in the aftermath of 
wars in 1948 and 1967 are still missing, the temporality of refugee experience has become 
permanent.  Regional  politics,  for  example  the  ongoing  crisis  in  Syria,  have  meant  that 
UNRWA sees  itself  as  operating under  a  constant  threat  to  itself  and the population it  is 
mandated to take care of. Because UNRWA lacks a political mandate it has no choice but to  
constantly adapt to external conditions and similar survival skills are also expected from the 
refugees. 
UNRWA acknowledges this also itself and states that even its best efforts are not enough to 
guarantee Palestinian refugees access to certain services or enable them to acquire certain 
skills and abilities. Despite, or because of, this constant contingency the agency is determined 
in its focus on human development. The constant emergency refugees have to face also makes 
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them forever vulnerable. Vulnerability itself can be attached to a myriad of conditions, social, 
physical or mental. Vulnerability works as a factor against which refugees are measured and 
divides them into numerous sub-categories. Every form of life and every mode of existence 
can have its own inherent vulnerability. Youth, elderly, nursing mothers, children traumatised 
by conflicts and those facing multiple displacements are all vulnerable in their own way. It is 
a  condition  that  can  never  be  escaped.  Together  emergency  and  vulnerability  necessitate 
constant  interventions  that  are  carried  out  through  UNRWA’s  services  of  healthcare, 
education, social safety net programmes and employment schemes. 
Human development’s central goal is to help refugees build their capacities which can then 
help them enlarge their freedom and make choices that they themselves value. Neoliberal 
governmentality works by directing the form of subjectivity that is required by this capacity-
building. Literacy, health and favourable social relations – human capital – become attributes 
of personal investment that can give an individual a competitive advantage and the subject 
becomes  reformed  as  homo  economicus.  Human  capital  and  homo  economicus  are  both 
concepts  that  Michel  Foucault  uses  to  discuss  origins  and developments  of  neoliberalism 
(Foucault,  2008).  Neoliberalism  and  governmentality,  by  definition,  generalise  economic 
knowledge  throughout  both  the  individual  and  social  body.  Human  capital  as  a  concept 
discussed by economic theorists focuses economic analysis on human life as such: instead of 
focusing  on human labour  as  a  quantitative  element,  its  qualities  also  gain  attention  and 
economics enters a new domain.  Regulation, management and screening of this capital  in 
question  thus  become  important.  UNRWA’s  goals  of  education  and  health  leading  to 
autonomous and calculative individuals can, as noted in the analysis, help generate even more 
development  and create  a  capable  workforce  (Shani,  2012;  Rajaram,  2018).  As  Foucault 
suggests:
“That  is  to  say,  there  will  be  a  population  which,  from the  point  of  view of  the 
economic baseline, will be constantly moving between, on the one hand, assistance 
provided in certain eventualities when it falls below the threshold and, on the other, 
both its use and its availability for use according to economic needs and possibilities. 
It will therefore be a kind of infra- and supra-liminal floating population, a liminal 
population  which,  for  an  economy  that  has  abandoned  the  objective  of  full 
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employment, will be a constant reserve of manpower which can be drawn on if need 
be, but which can also be returned to its assisted status if necessary.”
(Foucault, 2008: 206) 
This focus on concepts guided by economic knowledge has its own limits. Critical writings on 
the economy of biopolitics can themselves become immersed in the exact form of knowledge 
they seek to critique and in the end fail to address the phenomena at hand without leaning on 
certain limiting terminology (Evans & Reid, 2014: 66). It can be a symptom of the inability to 
utilise governmentality analysis outside traditional state formations as critique often traces its 
appearance through relying on interpretations of shifts  away from the social  state  (Helén, 
2016: 188). In the context of human development I do however believe that pointing out 
forms of economic knowledge does serve a certain purpose as human development itself has 
been claimed to offer an alternative to measuring welfare only in monetary terms  (Fukuda-
Parr,  2003;  Robeyns,  2005;  Sen,  1999).  However,  the  point  on  critique  should  not  be 
economics itself but the forms of freedom and subjectivity inscribed in the language of human 
development.
Despite  human  development’s  tenets  on  freedom not  all  choices  are  equally  valued  and 
freedom actually becomes the ability to make right kinds of choices. When homo economicus 
expands its capabilities in a right way it is better equipped to adapt to an environment of 
emergency and accepts,  same way as UNRWA also seems to have done,  that its  external 
conditions  are  not  something  to  change.  As  Alt  (2016)  has  stated,  this  does  not  mean 
becoming  passive  as  emergency  does  not  allow  that  to  happen.  Instead,  it  necessitates 
constant development that has to become internalised by the individual in addition to being 
carried out by devoted organisations.  The notion of precarity discussed briefly by Balibar 
(2016) and in more detail by Duffield (2019) who links it to current humanitarianism, or post-
humanitarianism according to him, could also serve as an alternative start  for analysis on 
human development. Though precarity can be used to assess structures of political economy it 
has also a biopolitical dimension that links contemporary existence and experience in both the 
global North and South.
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Because  of  the  way  in  which  human  development  can  be  understood  as  requiring  its 
internalisation by those who are being developed and a creator of specific subjectivities I have 
analysed it  as  a  form of  governmentality.  It  allows to  move beyond merely  pointing out 
components of neoliberalism as an economic doctrine and also for a better understanding of 
how issues concerning refugees and development become biopolitical. Instead of concluding 
that refugees are vulnerable, vulnerability can be addressed as a rationality for government. 
Instead of contemplating features of an emergency, emergency can be seen as a a condition 
for  power.  Returning  to  Foucault’s  understanding  of  power  as  something  present  in  all 
relationships  between  people  and always  existing  together  with  resistance  (1978:  93,  95; 
1982: 789), an analysis that does not take these interactions into account remains one-sided. 
An  analysis  of  biopolitics  at  stake  in  government  of  refugees  necessitates  considering  a 
multiplicity of power relations and forms of life, both because situations can vary from one 
situation of refugeeness to another with different actors being present and also because the 
endeavour of locating bare, apolitical life should only be seen as a starting point for further 
investigation. 
One-sidedness is evidently an issue also when only the knowledge of a single party is taken 
into account. This is the main limitation in this thesis, too. Although my research question has 
been  intentionally  limited  to  concentrate  on  the  subjectivities  that  arise  from UNRWA’s 
operations, analysing the form of governmentality present could be widened by a comparative 
approach.  Anthropology  has  researched  the  refugee  perspective  extensively  (Agier,  2008; 
Agier, 2011; Agier, 2016; Allan, 2014; Peteet, 2005) though there is also a danger of seeking 
for an essential refugee experience without being content with special social and historical 
reasons that make states of refugeeness different from each other (Malkki, 1995: 511). Still, as 
an  alternative  to  analysing  only  institutional  actors  such  as  UN  agencies  and  national 
governments,  other  partakers  in  power  need  to  be  considered  too.  Why  not  trace  the 
‘ungovernmentality’ present? If analytics of governmentality does not take into account the 
potential  of  tensions  and frictions  embedded in it  fails  to  see its  biopolitical  implications 
(Helén, 2016: 189).
In the section concerning alternative subjectivities I have attempted to give examples on some 
of the ways Palestinian refugees have stood in opposition to UNRWA practices. It is apparent 
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that the refugee status UNRWA administers can be interpreted in several ways and differing 
views on the subject as well as contesting ideas on the nature of aid and UNRWA’s role in 
general  can generate  friction.  Here again mainly UNRWA’s own publications are  used as 
sources. Even though this approach can lack dimension regarding the material used, it helps 
shed light what UNRWA sees as as the counter side of human development and acceptable 
refugee conduct. As refugees might potentially take measures against the agency itself and 
their host countries efforts in human development become a safety measure that contains the 
population.  Here security,  an aspect  of governmentality,  becomes evident  and UNRWA is 
framed a dispositif of security in itself.  This aspect of governmentality could be analysed 
more extensively as security is closely connected to development. UNRWA’s tendency to see 
refugees as a source of danger is merely one side of the issue at stake and analysing how the 
agency has defined its recently proclaimed protection mandate and how it strives to utilise it  
would possibly reveal a more complete understanding of its governmentality. It is also an 
aspect  that  differentiates  UNRWA from  other  refugee  operations  carried  out  by  UN  as 
protection is not provided by UNHCR to Palestinian refugees residing in UNRWA’s areas of 
operation. 
As I acknowledge the shortfalls stemming from the format of my thesis, sources chosen for 
analysis and utilisation of the theoretical framework, I believe that critical  assessments of 
biopolitics and governmentality can point out also alternative ways in which biopolitics and 
power are able to function. According to Alt  (2016: 242), “to the extent that contemporary 
colonising practices are neoliberal, biopolitical practices, politics has to involve challenging 
the limited ways in which these practices allow subjectivity and social existence to find their 
expression.” As biopower acts as a productive power that can direct how the conditions for 
existence, experience, desire and action are created (Helén, 2016: 281) there is no need for it 
to become reduced solely to the form of neoliberal governmentality. Locating the analysis of 
biopolitics outside conventional sources of power could facilitate the understanding of how 
life can take shape in alternative settings and how politics could be directed to changing not 
only the individualised subject itself. 
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